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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I investigate one stated purpose of deregulation in the electric utility 
industry -  to make utility operations more responsive to news releases, a proxy for 
market forces. My premise is that utilities providing electricity to highly deregulated 
states will be more responsive to market forces than those providing electricity to non­
deregulated states. I employ intraday data from April to June 2001, the year after 
deregulation, and from 1994, the year before deregulation. I also employ the Brown- 
Forsythe-Modified Levene (BFL) test to determine the volatility differences between 
days with released news and days without released news. The results of BFL F tests for 
the year 2001 indicate that utilities headquartered in and serving states that have 
undergone substantial deregulation respond to news releases more strongly than those 
utilities headquartered in and serving states that are still regulated. The BFL F tests for 
utilities in 1994 confirm the premise that regulated utilities are less responsive to news 
releases. Finally, I conduct regression tests for utilities, the results of which support the 
findings from BFL tests -  that all utilities serving highly deregulated states show 
pronounced responses to macroeconomic news releases. It appears that deregulation in 
the electric utility industry does, in fact, make utility operations more responsive to 
market forces and that deregulation is effective for states that implement a customer- 
choice model.
in
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This paper presents an empirical study of the effectiveness of deregulation in the 
electric utility industry, based on utilities' responses to two types of information: 
idiosyncratic news and macroeconomic news. The choice of this topic is motivated by a 
comparative examination of each state's restructuring plan relative to California's energy 
crisis and rolling blackout during the winter of 2000-2001, and Pennsylvania's successful 
deregulation plan that lowers retail rates, produces a reliable power supply, and improves 
services and choices of cleaner energy products. The deregulation of the electric utility 
industry is designed to reduce government intervention, to let the interaction of the 
supply and demand determine wholesale power price, and to encourage competition in 
retail markets so that customers may choose their power suppliers based on options of 
low rates or high-quality services. However, the success of deregulation depends mostly 
on each individual state's restructuring plans because these states' restructuring plans 
directly affect shareholders, managers, customers, and regulators. With open competition 
in the electric utility industry, money lost by imprudent investments can no longer be 
recovered. To serve stockholders more efficiently, then, management must seek cost 
control, on one hand, and, on the other hand, innovative ways to provide customers lower 
rates as well as multiple choices of services. Because stock prices respond quickly and
1
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2sharply and sometimes ruthlessly to any related news, shareholders face greater risks with 
uncertain cash flow caused by open competition.
The contribution of the study is listed as follows: (1) the success of deregulation 
depends largely on each state’s restructuring plan; therefore, this study provides state and 
federal legislatures with empirical evidence of the effectiveness of deregulation; (2) the 
finding of the study will influence the way state and federal legislatures enact utility laws; 
(3) this study provides empirical evidence of successful deregulation models; therefore, a 
further study of the restructuring policies of successful deregulation models could be 
done to improve the competition of the electric utility industry in all states; (4) this study 
provides methods that may be applied to other deregulated industries. To measure the 
success of the deregulation process of each state, I examine utilities’ responses to market 
forces, comparing utilities providing electricity to highly deregulated states with those 
providing electricity to regulated states in 2001. In order to develop a more accurate and 
robust base of reference, I also examine the responses of the specified utilities to market 
forces for the year 1994 (the year preceding deregulation). My study shows that 
deregulation in the electric utility industry does, in fact, make utility operations more 
responsive to market forces and that deregulation is indeed effective for states that 
implement a customer-choice model. Both BFL F tests and regression tests provide 
substantial empirical evidence that utilities respond more vigorously to market forces in a 
deregulated environment and that deregulation is indeed effective in states that 
implement a customer-choice model.
On December 4, 2000, newspapers carried the astonishing news that California 
was experiencing a severe energy crisis. In fact, the state issued a Stage Two emergency,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3which meant that the electrical power reserve had fallen below 5 percent or was expected 
to fall to that critical level within two hours. At that point, suppliers were allowed to cut 
power to customers who had signed up for a voluntary emergency interruption program 
(VIP) in exchange for a 15-20 percent rate reduction. In the days and weeks that 
followed, California’s power crisis continued to worsen. On December 7, an 
unprecedented Stage Three emergency was declared for approximately two hours, 
beginning at 5:15 p.m. A Stage Three emergency is called when the power reserve falls 
below 1.5 percent, a level that may trigger a “rolling” blackout, which shuts off a large 
area for a period of time, usually an hour, to relieve the burden to the transmission grid. 
Indeed, the California energy crisis grew even worse after powerful storms hit the state 
January 9 to 11, 2001. On the night of January 11, 2001, the California Independent 
System Operator (Cal-ISO), a non-profit corporation, declared a Stage Three emergency 
for only the second time in the state’s history, and blackouts were narrowly averted when 
the federally owned Bonneville Power Administration in the Pacific Northwest sent 1,000 
megawatts to parts of California. Still the crisis continued to deepen. On January 16, 
2001, electrical power to some businesses was shut off during so-called voluntary 
interruptible periods, and rolling blackouts began on January 17, 2001, at 11:30 a.m., 
when Cal-ISO ordered the utilities in Northern California to reduce their load by 500 
megawatts. By California law, it is the utilities’ responsibility to provide outage plans, to 
be approved by the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC). The power loss 
caused chaos in California. For more than thirty days during the winter of 2001, the state 
remained in a Stage Three emergency, and throughout the spring and summer of 2001
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4continued to urge conservation of electric power and to declare Stages One and Two 
emergencies as demand increased.1
In April 1994, the California PUC proposed a radical restructuring plan called the 
“blue book” and issued an initial order for “direct access” for retail customers, which 
would allow customers to choose their electricity suppliers. The law, enacted in 
September 1996, set up a statewide plan for the transition from the traditional 
monopolistic electric industry to a competitive one. Low-cost private generators were 
able to enter the market because the large power monopolies were required to divest their 
generation plants and to purchase power through a power clearinghouse called Power 
Exchange, which, in turn, determined power prices according to supply and demand in 
the spot market. Customers received an immediate 10 percent rate reduction, financed by 
bonds to be repaid by customer fees over a ten-year period. To stabilize electric rates* the 
law froze rates at the 1996 level to be extended until the year 2002 or until utilities 
recovered their stranded cost. And to help utilities recover their stranded cost more 
quickly, customers were charged another fee called the Competition Transition Charge to 
be extended until the year 2002. The final order for implementing free-market 
competition for all consumers in California was issued in April 1998. As of year 2002, 
the transmission segment of the electric utility industry in California is still regulated, and
1 News reports are compiled from daily news provided by the on-line resource of CNN. The site 
http://www.cnn.com/SPEClALS/2001 /power.crisis/stories.html provides links to important daily news 
related to the California crisis from Dec. 6 to March 19,2001. To compile this section I also used 
material from “The California Crisis -  California Timeline”, a source that provides news for major 
events related to deregulation in California form 1995 to May 2001, and available for download at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/blackout/califomia/timeline.html
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5the state’s investor-owned utilities have been ordered to turn over their transmission lines 
to the Cal-ISO, thereby assuring the reliability of transmissions.2
The deregulation of the electric utility industry has not been successful in 
California. Escalating energy costs have driven up the wholesale prices, and when 
demand has been high, power suppliers have been allowed to charge any price they want. 
Moreover, high profits by active generators have reduced the incentive for building new 
generation plants. Yet because of price caps, utilities are not allowed to pass on to 
customers the increasing cost of energy. In fact, two of the state’s largest utilities were 
forced into bankruptcy. Further exacerbating the crisis, utilities in other states have been 
unwilling to supply power to California because of their fear of not being paid. 
Moreover, shareholders’ investments have fallen sharply because of falling credit ratings 
and the financial instability of the utilities. In an effort to prop up the electric power 
investments, the California Public Utility Commission approved a rate increase of 40 
percent, effective May 2001, for customers of the two largest investor-owned utilities. 
The government also allowed utilities to sign long-term contracts with suppliers to reduce 
their risk in the wholesale market, but with the financial crisis the utilities face, suppliers 
hesitate to offer the long-term contracts. Although deregulation was designed to increase 
the competition in generation and distribution segments, the outcome in California failed. 
In fact, the California Public Utility Commission was forced to suspend retail access in
1 This section is compiled from “Status o f State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity as o f September
2002”, and is available for download at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf7electricity/chg_str/califomia.html
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6October 20013 and to submit a new plan—the ISO’s Market Design 2002 proposal—to
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.4
In contrast to California’s failed attempt at deregulation, Pennsylvania established
a successful model for deregulation in the electric utility industry. The Electricity
Generation Customer Choice and Competition Act, HB 1509, was passed in December
1996.5 Under that law, utilities were not required to divest their generation plants but to
submit their own locally adapted restructuring plans by September 1997. For example,
the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission approved PECO Energy Company's
restructuring plan in May 1998:
Under this plan, PECO customers will receive an 8 percent rate reduction 
next year, 6 percent in 2000, with 20 percent savings expected for those 
willing to shop for power. PECO will be allowed to recover $5.26 billion 
in stranded costs over a period of 12 years. Two-thirds of customers will 
be phased in to retail competition by January 1999 and all customers by 
January 2000.6
The success of Pennsylvania’s deregulation plan may be inferred from the
following comments by John Hanger, former Pennsylvania Commissioner and currently
CEO and President of PennFuture:
In 1996, Pennsylvania’s electricity rates were about 10-15% above the 
national average. Today they are 4% below the national average. 
Pennsylvania’s consumers have saved $2.84 billion since passage of its 
electricity competition statute in December 1996. 80,000 customers are 
buying cleaner or renewable energy products who never got these products 
from monopolies. . . .  No customer is paying more than what they were 
paying on Jan. 1, 1997.. . . 8,000 megawatts of new plant construction
3 See the “Status of State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity as of September 2002,” pp.6. Available 
for download at www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/califomia.html
4 See the “Status of State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity as of September 2002,” pp.l. Available 
for download at www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/caJifomia.html
5 See the “Status of State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity as of September 2002,” pp.2. Available 
for download at www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/pennsylvania.html
6 See the “Status o f State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity as of September 2002,” pp.3. Available 
for download at www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg^str/pennsyIvania.html
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7will come on line in 2001 and 2 0 0 2 .... More than 50% of all customers 
who have switched in the country have switched in Pennsylvania 7
Nationally there is no time frame for restructuring electric utilities; each state sets 
its own schedule. As expected, some states have moved quickly, whereas others have 
been more cautious. For instance, the report provided by the Louisiana Public Service 
Commission (PSC) in May 1999 recommended that no action be taken toward retail 
competition because of the lower-than-average electric rates and the relatively few 
generators in the state. However, the Louisiana PSC did issue a draft of a restructuring 
plan, effective January 2003, that would allow large industrial customers to choose their 
suppliers. But Louisiana has not yet called for utilities to divest their generation plants. 
The Louisiana PSC has requested another study to be due in 2005 to determine whether 
direct access will benefit all customers.8
For almost a century, the electric utility industry has been regulated by the 
government, at state and federal levels. The evolvement of the electric utility industry 
and the development of authority held by both state and federal governments over the 
industry are quite interesting. The opening of Thomas Edison's generating station on 
September 4,1882, in New York City initiated the modem electric power industry.9 The 
New York City gas and electric carbon-arc commercial and street lighting system served 
fifty-nine customers in a one-square-mile radius. By the end of the 1880s, many cities 
had small stations serving a small area. Then in 1896, using the hydraulic power from
7 See the Retail Energy Deregulation (RED) Index, 2nd edition, July 2001, from the Center for the 
Advancement of Energy Markets, pp. 33.
8 This section is compiled from “Status of State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity as of September 
2002”, and is available for download at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricitv/chg str/louisiana.html
9 See the “The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry: An Update,” Energy Information 
Administration, Office of Coal Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels, U.S. Department of Energy,
September 1996, pp. 105-115. Available for download at 
www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricitv/page/electric kid/append a.html
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8Niagara Falls with a multiple-phase generator designed by Nikola Tesla, George 
Westinghouse built the Niagara power station to transmit a massive amount of power to 
Buffalo, New York, over twenty miles away.10 Soon, private utilities sprang up rapidly, 
and competition was strong. The next big change came early in the twentieth century, 
when private electric utilities merged into large utility holding companies to offer more 
economical rates in large-scale operations by serving large cities and by reducing risks 
with diversification of investments in a variety of geographical areas.11 "By 1930, 90 
percent of all operating utilities were controlled by nineteen utility holding companies."12
The uncontrolled expansion of service areas by these utility holding companies 
prompted state regulations in the early 1900s. "Georgia, New York, and Wisconsin 
established State public service commissions in 1907, followed quickly by more than 20 
other States. Basic State powers included the authority to franchise the utilities to 
regulate their rates, financing, and service, and to establish utility accounting systems."13 
However, the state regulations had no power over interstate commerce, a fact that 
resulted in abuses by utility holding companies. A "pyramiding process" allowed these 
holding companies to increase their control over the bottom level of the operating 
utilities. First, the holding companies often issued bond and preferred stock to finance
10 See the “The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry: An Update,” Energy Information 
Administration, Office of Coal Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels, U.S. Department of Energy, 
September 1996, pp. 105-1 IS. Available for download at 
www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricitv/Dage/electric kid/append a.html
" See the “Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935:1935-1992,” Energy Information Administration, 
U.S. Department o f Energy, Jan. 1993, pp.3. Principal author of the report is Dr. Calvin A. Kent, 
Administrator of the Energy Information Administration.
12 See the “Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935:1935-1992,” Energy Information Administration, 
U.S. Department o f Energy, Jan. 1993, pp.6. Principal author of the report is Dr. Calvin A. Kent, 
Administrator o f the Energy Information Administration.
13 See the “The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry: An Update,” Energy Information 
Administration, Office of Coal Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels, U.S. Department of Energy, 
September 1996, pp. 105-115. Available for download at 
www.eia.doe.gov/cneafyelectricitv/page/electric kid/append a.html
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9the acquisition of the operating utilities, which in turn caused many operating utilities to 
fail. Second, the holding companies charged "exorbitant service fees to their subsidiary 
companies" and "these excessive fees (e.g., construction charges) were then capitalized 
into the accounts of the holding company, which in turn inflated the operating utility's 
book value and caused the rates charged to the customers to increase."14 Last, because of 
the excess benefits generated by the pyramid structure of holding companies, the sale of 
the operating utilities to other holding companies inflated prices well above their market 
value. As a result, the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) was passed in 
1935. Under this bill, all utility holding companies were required to register with the 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and to come under the supervision of the 
SEC. This bill also required each utility holding company that operated interstate 
commerce to be integrated into an efficient system, preferably confined to a single state 
so that it could be regulated by that state's public service commission. By the end of 
1950, all utility holding companies were integrated or simplified into smaller 
organizations.15
The growing demand for electricity from 1945 through 1970 was met by a 
combination of the expansion of privately owned utilities and federally owned power 
plants, development of commercial nuclear power plants, and, most significantly, 
improved technology that provided greater efficiency and reliability in generation and 
transmission.
14 See the “Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935:1935-1992,” Energy Information Administration, 
U.S. Department of Energy, Jan. 1993, pp.5. Principal author of the report is Dr. Calvin A. Kent, 
Administrator of the Energy Information Administration.
15 See the “Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: 1935-1992,” Energy Information Administration, 
U.S. Department of Energy, Jan. 1993, pp.12. Principal author of the report is Dr. Calvin A. Kent, 
Administrator of the Energy Information Administration.
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These productivity gains had a more substantive effect on customers, who 
watched the price of electricity decline. Adjusted to 1992 terms, a 
residential customer in 1892 paid more than 4 dollars for each kilowatt- 
hour, . . .  But by 1907, the price had dropped by more than half, to $1.56 
per kWh. As utilities pursued incremental technological advances, prices 
fell to 55 cents in 1927 and 19 cents in 1947. . . .  the price of electricity 
dropped to 13 cents per kWh in 19[5]3 and 9 cents in 1967.16
For almost a century now -  since the beginning of electric power regulation -  
every electric utility system has been regulated by both federal and state governments 
when it operates three functional segments -  generation, transmission, and distribution -  
as a monopolistic market. But a 1944 Supreme Court ruling allowed Hope Natural Gas 
(Federal Power Commission vs. Hope Natural Gas Company) to cover the original or 
replacement cost, plus a reasonable rate of return;17 thereby a regulation policy was 
established which gave customers the lowest rates possible as well as allowing utilities a 
reasonable rate of return.
During the 1970s, the electric utility power industry faced major challenges. 
Increasing oil prices, caused by the oil embargo and energy crisis in 1972, drove the 
power cost up. Then capital costs increased because of growing inflation, and, finally, the 
demand for nuclear power plummeted because of environmental concerns prompted by 
the incident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.18 To 
meet these challenges, several steps were taken. In order to reduce dependency on
16 See the “Post World War II "Golden Years," Available for download at 
http://americanhistory.si.edu/csr/powering/hirsh2/fnnain.htm
17 See the “The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry: An Update,” Energy Information 
Administration, Office of Coal, Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels, U.S. Department of Energy, 
September 1996, pp. 105-115. Available for download at 
www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricitv/Dage/electric kid/append a.html
18 See the “The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry: An Update,” Energy Information 
Administration, Office of Coal, Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels, U.S. Department of Energy, 
September 1996, pp. 105-115. Available for download at 
www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricitv/page/electric kid/append a.html
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
foreign oil, to promote alternative energy sources, and to increase competition among 
generation plants, Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPC) of 
1978 that would encourage a new class of producers, called Independent Power 
Producers (IPPs) or Qualifying Facilities (QFs), to join the commercial power production 
market. These unregulated IPPs generated power for their own use, plus a surplus to sell, 
or they co-generated a usable energy as a byproduct of generation. For instance, the 
paper industry often produces wood waste as a byproduct of the manufacturing process, 
which, in turn, can become a so-called renewable fuel to generate electricity.19 With the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s approval, IPPs were allowed to sell their 
energy to utilities at the marginal cost (avoided cost) that utilities would have incurred in 
producing that power.20 These avoided costs were usually set up in favor of producers to 
encourage more unregulated producers to enter the wholesale market. With this 
favorable support, EPPs produced about 9 percent of all electricity in the U. S. during 
1991.21
A long debate over the PUHCA reform movement began in the 1980s.22 Those 
who advocated reform emphasized that the Act put limits on diversification that, in 
effect, weakened the holding companies' competition and growth. Further, the advocates 
maintain, the Law also prevented IPPs from purchasing operating utilities because that
19 See the “The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry: An Update,” Energy Information 
Administration, Office of Coal, Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels, U.S. Department of Energy, 
September 1996,105-1 IS. Available for download at 
www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricitv/page/electric kid/append a.html
20 See the report from the Value Line Investment Survey dated February 24,1995, Vol. 50, Pt. 4, pp. 1732
21 See the “The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry: An Update,” Energy Information 
Administration, Office of Coal, Nuclear, Electric and Alternate Fuels, U.S. Department of Energy, 
September 1996, pp. 105-115. Available for download at 
www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricitv/page/electric kid/append a.html
22 Detailed debate over the PUHCA reform can be found in the article of “Public Utility Holding Company 
Act o f 1935: 1935-1992,” Energy Information Administration, Office of the Administrator, U.S. 
Department o f Energy, Jan. 1993, pp.23-27.
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would put them under the regulation of the PUHCA; thus, IPPs would be forced to divest 
all businesses unrelated to utilities.23 Those who opposed the reform of the PUHCA 
contended that repealing of the Act would promote monopoly control in the industry and 
the diversification would only increase difficulties for governments in monitoring the 
businesses. Moreover, the diversification would also increase the risk, not only to 
shareholders but also to ratepayers. Two Public Laws, 99-186 and 99-648, passed in 
1985 and 1986 respectively, provided limited diversification for utilities, IPPs, or any 
other nonutilities. Public Law 99-186 allowed utility holding companies to purchase 
coal-generation facilities in any geographical area; whereas Public Law 99-648 allowed 
nonutility holding companies to own one gas utility subsidiary.24 With the increasing 
number of mergers and acquisitions, most of the utility holding companies operated two 
types of businesses: regulated and unregulated.
The process of the PUHCA reform was accelerated when President Bush issued 
an order on July 26, 1989, directing the Department of Energy to develop a 
comprehensive National Energy Strategy. The main focus of the National Energy 
Strategy was to allow generators to freely compete in wholesale markets across the 
United States.25 After a long debate in the House, the PUHCA reform was passed by 
Congress in 1992 as the Energy Policy Act. This Act is the most comprehensive piece of 
legislation in energy history and impacts all producers, utilities, and customers
23 See the “Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935:1935-1992,” Energy Information Administration, 
U.S. Department of Energy, Jan. 1993, pp.25. Principal author of the report is Dr. Calvin A. Kent, 
Administrator of the Energy Information Administration.
24 See the “Public Utility Holding Company Act o f 1935:1935-1992,” Energy Information Administration, 
U.S. Department of Energy, Jan. 1993, pp.29. Principal author of the report is Dr. Calvin A. Kent, 
Administrator of the Energy Information Administration.
25 See the “Public Utility Holding Company Act o f 1935:1935-1992,” Energy Information Administration, 
U.S. Department of Energy, Jan. 1993, pp.57. Principal author of the report is Dr. Calvin A. Kent, 
Administrator of the Energy Information Administration.
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nationwide as well as federal and state governments. Producers are allowed to petition 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for access to transmission grids owned by 
private utilities, and utilities that provide the services are allowed to charge fees to 
recover their cost. In this Act, a new class of generators, Exempt Wholesale Generators 
(EWGs), is defined as "any person determined by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) to be engaged directly . . .  at wholesale [market exclusively]."26 
These EWGs are not subject to regulation under the PUHCA, but serve to increase the 
competition in the wholesale market and to expedite the deregulation of the generation 
segment of the electric utility industry.
In July 1996, Congressman Dan Schaefer introduced a bill to further deregulate 
the distribution segment in the electric utility industry. Under his proposal, each state 
was required to submit a restructuring plan allowing customers to choose their power 
suppliers by December 15, 2000.27 While the FERC set guidelines for wholesale market 
rules and transmission accessibility, Schaefer's bill gave states freedom to implement 
retail access.28
Since deregulation legislation, many states, like California, Rhode Island, 
Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and New York, have responded quickly and have either 
proposed or implemented restructuring plans for the transition in the electric utility 
industry from a monopolistic model to a customer-choice model. Because of the 
independence of the restructuring plans implemented in each state, the progress o f the 
deregulation in the retail market in each state is also different. As of September 2002, the 
District of Columbia, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
26 See the Energy Policy Act, Section 711 of subtitle A for details.
27 See the report from the Value Line Investment Survey dated August 23,1996, Vol. 51, Pt. 7, pp. 1729
28 See the report from the Value Line Investment Survey dated October 11,1996, Vol. 52, Pt. 1, pp. 701
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Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas have opened full retail access to all 
customers. Some states opened retail access only to commercial and industrial customers 
-  Nevada and Oregon. One state -  Oklahoma -  has delayed implementation indefinitely. 
California has suspended retail access, and Louisiana is still studying options for partial 
deregulation.29
At the beginning of the twentieth century, policy makers believed that the vertical 
integrated structure of the electric utility industry provided large-scale economies; 
thereby offering customers lower electric rates. Later in the century, electric utilities 
were further protected, guaranteed a cost recovery under the cost-of-service regulation. 
Because of imprudent investments and increased power costs during the 1970s, electric 
rates spiked, and pressure by customers to lower electric rates brought about the need for 
deregulation. The history of the electric utility industry reveals the interesting fact that 
both regulation and deregulation were requested by the same groups, customers and 
electric utilities; therefore, it is very important to know whether the implementation of 
governmental policies serves the purpose that policy makers intend. My conjecture is 
that with regulation as a protection cap for the utility industry, market becomes less 
efficient and more sluggish to the response of news releases. Furthermore, in a highly 
deregulated market, information will be incorporated in prices rapidly and response to 
new information will be strong. Because the success of deregulation in the electric utility 
industry depends on the response of utilities to market forces, I test the effectiveness of 
deregulation in the utility industry, using the utilities' responses to macroeconomic news, 
the best measures of market forces, and the idiosyncratic news. Ross (1989) maintains
29 See the “Status o f State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity, Timeline as of September 2002,” 
Available for download at www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricitv/chg str/retail access timeline.html
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that the arrival of information has a direct impact on the volatility of stock prices in an 
arbitrage-free environment. So in order to observe stock return responses to news 
releases, I employ second-by-second intraday stock returns to test the volatility 
differences between days with news releases and days without news releases. Thus, the 
value of this study is twofold: to provide methods for testing the effectiveness of 
deregulation that may be applied to any deregulated industry and to provide empirical 
evidence of the effectiveness of various states’ restructuring plans. Further study of the 
implementation of the successful models will help policy makers expedite restructuring 
plans in the electric utility industry in all states.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are three prevailing theories o f economic regulation: Public Interest theory, 
Capture theory, and Buffering theory. The Public Interest theory holds that traditional 
regulation corrects market failures on behalf of consumers. The Capture theory contends 
that regulation is captured by regulated industries to protect their interests at the expense 
of consumers. The Buffering theory refers to a wealth redistribution among participatory 
groups in which a successful regulator adjusts regulated prices to benefit both producers 
and consumers.
Not many empirical studies support the Public Interest theory, because their 
findings show that regulation has only minor and slow effects in lowering prices and in 
alleviating price discrimination for consumers. Similarly, few empirical studies give 
support to the Capture theory, which maintains that industrial groups profit from charging 
higher prices and exercising price discrimination. Contrary to the weak support for the 
Public Interest theory and the Capture theory, many studies support the Buffering theory 
by providing evidence that regulation reduces firm-specific risks as well as systematic 
risk, thereby increasing shareholders’ wealth, and, at the same time, offering lower prices 
to consumers. However, in a deregulated environment, firms are no longer “buffered” by 
regulation, but, in fact, are more sensitive to economic forces and idiosyncratic news.
16
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A number of empirical studies examine the following concerns: (1) factors that 
affect security price adjustment, (2) the speed of price adjustment to idiosyncratic news 
and macroeconomic news, measures of economic forces, and (3) volatility persistence. 
However, no articles examine the differences among responses to macroeconomic news 
and idiosyncratic news before and after deregulation. Furthermore, no articles probe the 
effectiveness of deregulation by comparing responses to macroeconomic news and 
idiosyncratic news between highly deregulated firms and regulated firms in any industry. 
According to the Buffering theory, the responses to economic forces and idiosyncratic 
news are stronger and the volatility persistence is weaker in a deregulated environment 
than in a regulated environment. It follows, therefore, that the responses to economic 
forces and idiosyncratic news are stronger and the volatility persistence is weaker in a 
highly deregulated environment.
2.1: An Overview of Theories of Economic Regulation
“Economic regulation” refers broadly to any government intervention, at either 
state or federal level, in the economic sphere (Posner 1974); but within this broad 
category of economic control, there are more narrowly defined areas to be analyzed: the 
forms of government intervention, the beneficiaries of regulation, and the effectiveness of 
regulation (Stigler 1971). There are basically three prevailing theories of economic 
regulation: Public Interest theory, Capture theory, and Buffering theory.
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2.1.1; Public Interest Theory (Consumer Protection Theory)
The development of the Public Interest theory is based on two assumptions: (1) 
that the economic market is inefficient and inequitable without regulation; and (2) that 
government regulation is costless (Posner 1974). The Public Interest theory advocates 
traditional regulation, according to its proponents, and serves to correct market failure on 
behalf o f consumers. One example of market failure occurs when goods or services 
needed by a majority of customers in a specific area are controlled by a single company. 
That company, having monopolistic power, can then exploit customers by charging 
exorbitant prices or by refusing to provide goods or services to unprofitable areas. 
Therefore, according to the Public theory, the demand for regulation serves to protect 
customers from exploitation or abandonment by monopolistic companies. Another 
example o f market failure is an externality, which occurs when an industry impacts others 
either negatively or positively and is not penalized or compensated. The use of taxes for 
industries with negative externality, the use of subsidies for industries with positive 
externality, and the use of property rights to promote technological inventions are 
examples of regulation for the benefit of the pubic interest.
2.1.2: Capture Theory (Producer Protection Theory)
In contrast to regulation for protecting consumers' interest, the Capture theory 
requires that regulated industries or producers seek regulation to protect their own 
interests. This theory assumes that producers have influence on the structure and process 
of regulation; thus, regulation is “captured” by producers to gain benefits from regulation.
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Stigler (1971) proposes a refined version of the Capture theory. He maintains that 
regulation is the product of political decision-making, which is different from market 
decision-making. Market decision-making occurs frequently and involves only those 
who are directly affected, whereas political decision-making involves all voters, 
interested or uninterested. The price of the political decision-making includes costs of 
lobbying, contributions to political parties, and costs of disseminating information to 
individuals who have little or no concern with the issues. Thus, "producer protection,” as 
this process is called, benefits a small group of industries holding large financial 
resources, because only the smaller, more concentrated industries with a large per capita 
stake have enough resources to invest in campaigns for legislation (Peltzman 1976). 
Therefore, Stigler argues, the demand for regulation does not correct market failure for 
customers' sake, but does, in fact, serve to transfer wealth from a large number of 
diffused group (customers) to a compact and more influential group, i.e., participatory 
industrial group, through regulatory processes in the form of cash subsidies, price control, 
and entry restriction.
2.1.3: Buffering Theory (Political Support Theory)
Instead of protecting only one compact industrial unit, the so-called Buffering 
theory refers to regulation support from a combination of industry and consumers, “[t]he 
former obtaining some monopoly profits from regulation, the latter obtaining lower prices 
(or better service) than they would in an unregulated market—all at the expense of 
unorganized, mostly consumer, groups” (Posner 1974). This Buffering theory, developed 
by Peltzman (1976), adapts Stigler’s Capture theory in a formal model to demonstrate
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Peltzman’s own theory that economic regulation is not merely a wealth transfer from 
customers to a producer group, as suggested by Stigler, but a wealth redistribution 
through a political process among interested groups.30 There are three interpretations of 
Peltzman’s model: (1) that total wealth is distributed among interested groups: producers 
and customers; (2) that regulation reduces firm-specific risk, and possibly systematic risk 
as well; and (3) that the price discrimination problems existing in monopolistic and 
competitive markets are attenuated through “cross-subsidization.”
In response to changes in demand and costs, Peltzman shows in his model how a 
successful “buffering” regulator adjusts the regulated prices to benefit both producers and 
customers. Thus, the total wealth that a regulator can distribute changes when economic 
factors change. For example, a change in marginal costs, in productivity, or in demand 
affects the total profit that the regulator can distribute. Because of this, a “buffering” 
regulator makes appropriate adjustments so that customers absorb some of producers’ 
losses and, in return, producers share gains with their customers. For example, an 
increase in the marginal cost of production reduces the total profit, which, in turn, 
prompts the regulator to increase the price charged to customers, thereby buffering 
producers’ losses. On the other hand, an increased demand in production prompts the 
regulator to reduce prices. Thus, the higher profits generated by increased demand will 
be shared by customers.
Moreover, the structure of regulated prices provides a cushion, or buffer, for 
producers against the impact of sudden changes in demand and costs, thereby reducing
30 See Sam Peltzman, ‘Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” The Journal o f Law and 
Economics, April 1976, pp. 211-240 for the details o f the mathematical model.
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the volatility of stock prices and the risk of the regulated firms. If the changes are 
economy-wide, regulation should even reduce systematic risk.
Furthermore, a “buffering” regulator will suppress some economic forces in order 
to attenuate the problem of price discrimination among customers. One example of an 
economic force that a regulator may suppress is cost disparity; high-cost customers are 
subsidized by the low-cost customers. This phenomenon appears in many industries; 
e.g., utility customers in rural areas subsidized by those in urban areas and airline 
services in unprofitable small cities subsidized by large cities. Consequently, regulated 
firms are less sensitive to economic forces than unregulated firms.
2.2; Empirical Study Relating to Regulated Theories 
2.2.1: Public Interest Theory
If regulation does, in fact, protect consumers, one should find a consistency of 
increased wealth of consumers directly related to the implementation of regulations in 
different industries, such as drug, electricity, water, natural gas, airline, cable, and 
transportation. However, empirical studies do not support this Public Interest theory. For 
instance, the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act 
were designed to give the Food and Drug Administration authority to regulate new drugs 
for safety and effectiveness before they enter the market (Peltzman 1973). But in a cost- 
benefit analysis for 1970, Peltzman found that the cost of implementing the amendment 
far exceeded the benefit. Peltzman maintains that “[t]he net effect of the amendments on 
consumers is comparable to their being taxed something between 5 and 10 percent on 
their $5 billion annual drug purchases.”
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Moreover, findings from various studies show little effect of regulation on 
monopolistic industries like electricity and natural gas, both of which are considered 
natural monopolies because of their extensive economic power. Therefore, regulation is 
designed to diminish its economic power for customers’ benefit in terms of price, 
availability, and service quality (Jordan 1972).31 However, empirical studies suggest that 
regulation has little effect on price and price discrimination. Electric utilities are a good 
example. Stigler and Friedland (1962) conclude that “[t]he regulation of electric utilities 
by state commissions from 1907 through 1937 had no measurable impact on the level of 
electric utility rates, on the charging of discriminatory prices, and on the market values of 
utility stocks.” Likewise, studies o f electric utility rates on commercial, industrial, and 
residential customers by Jackson (1969) and Moore (1970) indicate that regulation has 
little effect on electric utility rates. Although the earliest state regulations started in 1907 
in Georgia, New York, and Wisconsin to lower electric utility rates, commercial and 
industrial consumers began to benefit from lower electric utility rates during the years of 
1940-1950. The least powerful group, residential customers, who were supposed to 
benefit the most, had waited until 1960 to realize lower rates (Jackson 1969).
Although regulation of monopolistic industries was intended to lower prices and 
reduce price discrimination for public consumption while limiting producers’ economic 
power, all research findings show minor and slow effects of regulation in lowering prices 
and reducing price discrimination. Posner (1972, 1974) suggests two reasons to explain 
the minor and slow effects of regulation in lowering prices and reducing price 
discrimination: (1) agencies or commissions, usually at the state level, are given authority
31 See Jordan (1972) for detailed discussion about prior market structure and the effects o f government 
regulations in monopolistic, oligopolistic and competitive industries.
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to regulate rates, but it is “mission impossible” to figure out the costs of regulated firms;
(2) with the increasing complexity of economy, the costs o f effectively supervising 
agencies by legislation rise over time.
Upadhyaya et al. (1997) examine the stated purpose of the Public Interest theoiy 
and the failure to produce benefits laid out by Posner: lowering prices and reducing price 
discrimination in public consumption while limiting producers’ economic power. 
Upadhyaya et al. show that the regulation is ineffective in reducing the price of the 
electricity for 1922 and 1927. However, the study does find a negative relationship 
between utility prices and regulation for the year 1932, indicating that regulation is 
“somewhat successful in lowering the price of electricity.” MacAvoy (1971) supports 
Posner’s conclusion that customers suffered a shortage of natural gas due to the 
reallocation of reserves to unregulated industrial users in the 1960s as a result of 
inequitable price ceilings set by Federal Power Commission. All these studies provide 
some evidence that the intention of regulation is for consumers’ benefit, but has little 
effect in reducing prices because of ineffectiveness.
2.2.2: Capture Theory
Stigler (1971) examines the Capture theory by studying the weight limits on 
trucks and occupational licensing and finds that weight limits on trucks supports the 
Capture theory whereas occupational licensing does not. Stigler examines three possible 
factors that might have an influence on the regulations of weight limits on trucks for all 
states in 1932 and 1933: (1) the number of trucks per 1000 fanners, (2) the length of the 
average railroad haul, and (3) the percentage of well-preserved highways in each state.
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These three factors represent three participatory groups: (1) farmers who own trucks for 
transportation of goods, (2) railroads that transport farm products, and (3) the public that 
is most concerned about the damage from heavy trucks. The results show that these three 
factors have impact on regulations of the weight limits on trucks for all states in 1932 and 
1933 and “the larger the truck population in farming, the less competitive the trucks [are] 
to railroads, and the better the highway system.” However, the effects of occupational 
licensing do not support the Capture theory. By contrast, Upadhyaya et al. (1997) 
support the Capture theory and suggest that while regulation may initiate lower price and 
reduce price discrimination for consumers’ benefit, in the long run the industry becomes 
more influential in regulation, which, in turn, causes the price o f electricity to increase.
Some empirical studies support the Capture theory by providing evidence that 
producers exploit price regulation to get higher profits. Peltzman (1971) finds evidence 
that privately owned utilities are more likely to manipulate price control for their own 
gain than are government-run utilities. And Jordan (1972), in his study of the 
effectiveness o f the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission 
regulations, concludes that regulation has not effectively attenuated price discrimination 
in interstate airlines, or in railroad, or in motor carriers, but in each instance “[rjegulatory 
actions and procedures have allowed the carriers. . .  to reach agreements regarding prices 
and to enforce adherence to these agreements.” In fact, there have been significant 
increases in price levels for all these. All these studies evidence that producers have 
influence on the structure and process of regulation; thus, regulation is captured by 
producers to gain benefits from regulation.
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2.2.3: Buffering Theory
The Buffering theory proposed by Peltzman (1976) maintains that total wealth is 
distributed among participatory groups, regulation reduces firm-specific risk and possibly 
systematic risk as well, and the price discrimination problem is attenuated through cross­
subsidization. Whereas many researchers’ findings support the Buffering theory, others 
argue that regulatory lag causes price stickiness that, in turn, increases firm-specific risk 
and decreases shareholder wealth because of the fluctuation of profit streams. Recent 
empirical studies in the utility industry focus on two factors that determine stock returns: 
(1) the relationship between regulation and systematic risk and firm-specific risk, and (2) 
the relationship between regulation and cost of capital.
Using the relationship between daily returns and the natural log of ratios of profit- 
maximizing price to actual price in nine states for years 1969 and 1974 to test whether 
regulation increases systematic risk for 1974, when fuel prices rose dramatically, Meyer 
and Leland (1980) show that because of regulated price, rising costs associated with the 
energy crisis did not result in higher systematic risk. Employing the same method of 
analysis, Norton (1985) reexamines the effect of regulation on systematic risk for the 
period 1969-74 using monthly data and the average of the 1969 and 1974 ratios of profit- 
maximizing price to actual price. Norton supports Meyer and Leland’s finding that 
regulation lowers systematic risk during the period of rising costs as a result of wealth 
redistribution.
Norton (1985) further examines the relationship between the intensity of 
regulation, classified as unregulated, weakly regulated, and strongly regulated, and 
systematic risk in the utility industry, where the intensity of regulation is determined by
32 See Joskow and MacAvoy (1975), Spann (1976), Chandrasekaran and Dukes (1981), Archer (1981).
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three factors: (1) the power of the respective commissions, (2) the size of commission 
staff, and (3) the budget size. He concludes that the higher the intensity of regulation, the 
lower the systematic risk. Contrary to other research findings, Norton shows that 
leverage (total debt/assets), capital intensity (net plant/total assets), diversification (total 
revenue/electric operating revenues), and manufacturing intensity (manufacturing 
employees/total employees) are not significant in determining systematic risk when the 
intensity of regulation is taken into account for systematic risk.
Joskow (1974), Clarke (1980) and Norton (1988) all document the fact that 
regulation shifts some of the burden of rising costs from producers to consumers, a fact 
which supports the Buffering theory. Norton (1988) also examines the impact of OPEC 
oil supply shock on shareholder wealth for the utility industry and finds an adverse effect 
on shareholder wealth caused by the 1973 oil supply shock. But contrary to the belief 
that regulatory lag amplifies the adverse effects, the adverse effects are softened by 
regulation. Thus, he concludes that “shareholder wealth is endogenous to regulation” and 
that a “regulation-induced buffering effect” reduces firms’ risk and, in turn, increases 
shareholder wealth.
The first line of studies indicates that regulation provides a cushion for the utility 
industry against unexpected changes of demand and cost. The impact of rising costs does 
not trigger higher systematic risk. Since regulation sometimes shifts some of the burden 
caused by rising costs from producers to consumers, it reduces the variability of stock 
prices and the risk for the regulated utilities. The higher the intensity of regulation, the 
lower the systematic risk. According to these studies, regulation results in increasing 
shareholders’ wealth.
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Another line of studies deals with the relationship between regulation and the cost 
of capital. In the past, electric utility rates have been regulated to give customers low 
rates and to allow utilities to cover the cost of service, plus a fair rate of return 
(Blacconiere et al. 2000); therefore, regulators normally assume that the cost of capital is 
a determinant in the regulated rate of return. However, Brennan and Schwartz (1982) 
show that the expected regulatory policy determines the cost of capital in the utility 
industry. Archer (1981) studies the relationship between the intensity of regulation and 
the cost of capital and finds that the higher the intensity of regulation, the slower the 
response to a utility’s request for rate increases and the higher the cost of capital for the 
requesting utility.
The second line of studies indicates that the cost of capital is endogenous to 
regulation. The higher the intensity of regulation and the slower the response to a 
utility’s request for rate increases, the higher the cost of capital for the requesting utility. 
Whereas some regulatory policies reduce the cost of capital, some have adverse impact 
on the cost of capital. The increased cost of capital reduces the market value of firms and 
thereby decreases shareholders’ wealth.
All the above studies show that since regulatory policies have profound influence 
on firm-specific risk, systematic risk, and the cost of capital, both expected earnings and 
earnings’ responsiveness to market environment are affected, depending on the intensity 
of regulation and the effectiveness of regulatory policies. Utilities operating in states 
with high intensity of regulation show less response to market forces than utilities 
operating in states with less intensity of regulation.
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Conversely, in a deregulation environment, producers are no longer “buffered” 
from exogenous economic impact; therefore, increasing competition along with 
uncertainty of expected earnings increases firms’ risks as well as systematic risk, which, 
in turn, decreases shareholders’ wealth. Nwaeze (1999) examines the effects of the 
deregulation act, Energy Policy Act of 1992, on the market value of earnings and asset 
components for electric utilities. The uncertainty of future earnings causes managers to 
take precaution when dealing with competition, and findings suggest that managers 
increase capital spending to alleviate the associated risk and reduce capital intensity for 
future competition. He also finds that market value of each asset component is sensitive 
to the market movement and long-term interest rates. Thus, the adverse effect of the 
Energy Policy Act for the incentive-regulated utilities and for those regulated by a 
performance-based compensation scheme is less for traditional utilities. Finally, the 
study shows that overall deregulation of the electric utility industry causes the market 
value of traditional utilities to drop.
Blacconiere et al. (2000) examine the effect of ongoing deregulation in the 
electric utility industry on the relation between market value, book value, and earnings 
for all investor-owned electric utilities for 1988-1996 and suggest that deregulation 
influences the relevance of financial statement information. They show that book value 
becomes less important in explaining the value of a firm whereas earnings become more 
important in explaining the value of a firm. Since each state has a different pace of 
deregulation, the Blacconiere’ study shows that the importance of earnings in explaining 
market value increases in highly deregulated states.
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2.3; An Overview of Information Theory 
and Its Empirical Studies
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama 1970) says that the market value of an 
asset reflects all relevant information, which includes the information regarding the 
expected cash flows, as well as the discount rate that reflects the riskiness of the expected 
cash flows. Any information about the timing and the magnitudes of expected cash flows 
and any changes in expected real interest rates, inflation, default risk, and various risk 
premiums are quickly incorporated into the market price of the asset. Thus, information 
relevant to the timing and the magnitudes of expected cash flows is idiosyncratic news 
and macroeconomic news. And because this is true, market efficiency and volatility of 
security returns have intrigued researchers for over three decades, especially studies that
(1) identify the relevance of information and (2) analyze the speed of price adjustment to 
relevant information and volatility persistence.
The study by Patell and Wolfson (1984) analyzes the speed of price adjustment to 
idiosyncratic news: earnings and dividend announcements and the volatility persistence 
of stock returns. They find that it takes only five to ten minutes to adjust security prices 
in response to earnings and dividend information and that return volatility continues even 
into the following day.
Many studies examine the impact of macroeconomic news announcements on 
different markets: (1) interest rate and foreign exchange futures markets (Ederington and 
Lee 1993), (2) the British Pound, Canadian Dollar, Deutsche Mark, Japanese Yen, and 
Swiss Franc currency futures markets (Christie-David et al. 2000), (3) the Municipal over 
Treasury bonds, the Treasury notes over Treasury bonds, and the Treasury bills over 
Eurodollar futures interest-rate spreads (Aggarwal et al. 2001), (4) the British Long Gilt,
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the German Government Bond, the Japanese Government Bond, the Italian Government 
Bond, and the U. S. Treasury Bond futures (Christie-David et al. 2002).
Ederington and Lee (1993) find that the majority of the price adjustments occur 
within the first minute of trading after a news announcement. But because information is 
not fully incorporated into prices during the first minute, high volatility remains for at 
least fifteen minutes after announcement, as more information accrues in the market, and 
remains slightly elevated for several hours. They also find that the direction of price 
adjustments after the first minute of trading is independent of the first-minute price 
adjustment, implying that individual investors form their expectations about the future 
security prices. Christie-David et al. (2000) also find that the majority of the price 
adjustments occurs within the first few minutes of trading after a news announcement and 
that volatilities remain high for fifteen to forty-five minutes, depending on respective 
markets. In the studies of Aggarwal et al. (2001) and Christie-David et al. (2002), 
however, the results show that it takes considerable time, varying from fifteen to seventy- 
five minutes, for the prices to adjust fully to a relevant news announcement.
It has been demonstrated that different markets react differently to 
macroeconomic news announcements. For instance, Jain (1988) shows that security 
prices respond to the release of the consumer price index (CPI) and the money supply. 
Ederington and Lee (1993) find that the employment report, the producer price index 
(PPI), the CPI, and the durable goods orders had the greatest impact on interest rates in 
the 1988 to 1991 period. One study also shows that the PPI and the CPI affect Gilt and 
Bund futures (Christie-David et al. 2002). In another study, Flannery and Protopapadakis 
(2002) examine the impact of real macroeconomic variables on aggregate equity returns
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and find that the CPI, the PPI, a Monetary Aggregate, Balance of Trade, Employment 
Report, and Housing Starts affect the aggregate equity returns.
2.4: Summary
The market value of an asset reflects all available relevant information; that is, 
information which includes the expected cash flows and the discount rates reflecting the 
riskiness of these expected cash flows. Since regulation provides a buffer for the utility 
industry against unexpected changes of demand and cost, the riskiness of a utility’s 
expected cash flows is reduced, a fact which, in turn, increases the market values of 
utilities. Many empirical studies support the position that regulation reduces systematic 
risk and firm-specific risk; therefore, yielding evidence that producers are buffered by 
regulation and that regulated firms are less responsive to exogenous impact. However, 
the utility industry has been moving toward deregulation in retail market since 1994, 
when each state took control of its own pace of deregulation (Blacconiere et al. 2000). If 
the Buffering theory holds, then the stock prices are less sensitive to the arrival of 
information in a regulated environment. Thus, the response to economic forces and 
idiosyncratic news in a regulated environment is weaker than that in a deregulated 
environment. For this reason, those utilities operating in highly deregulated states 
respond to economic forces and idiosyncratic news more strongly than those operating in 
less deregulated or regulated states. I am not aware of any article studying the 
differences of responses to macroeconomic news and idiosyncratic news for firms in any 
industry that operate in a regulated environment and that later move into a deregulated 
environment. My conjecture is (1) that the economic forces and idiosyncratic news will
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have less influence on utilities before deregulation than after deregulation and (2) that the 
responses to economic forces and idiosyncratic news are weaker in a regulated 
environment. Since the pace of deregulation in utilities varies among all states, the speed 
of price adjustment to economic forces and idiosyncratic news and the volatility 
persistence will be different. My conjecture is that the responses to economic forces and 
idiosyncratic news are stronger in a highly deregulated environment than those responses 
in a less deregulated or regulated environment.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1: Identification of Two Categories of Utilities
Empirical studies indicate that regulation provides a cushion for the utility 
industry against exogenous economic impact, thereby reducing the variability of stock 
prices and the risk for the regulated utilities. In other words, firms that operate in a 
regulated environment are less responsive to economic forces and idiosyncratic news. 
After the industry has been deregulated, these firms are not “buffered” by the regulation; 
thus, they become more responsive to economic forces and idiosyncratic news. Some 
studies also indicate that the higher the intensity of regulation, the lower the systematic 
risk and firm-specific risk. In other words, highly deregulated firms normally face higher 
risk because they respond to exogenous factors more quickly and more strongly than less 
deregulated firms. However, the success of deregulation depends largely on each 
individual state’s restructuring plans because each state establishes its own level and pace 
of deregulation.
In an effort to provide policy makers with empirical evidence regarding the 
impact of deregulation and the relative effectiveness of each state’s restructuring plan, I 
have selected the year 2001 as the year after deregulation and the year 1994 as the year
33
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before deregulation. Given the fact that each state establishes its own pace of 
deregulation, I then identify two categories of utilities in order to examine the differences 
of responses to news releases in 2001:
(i) Utilities providing electricity to states that are considered to be moving 
successfully toward a competitive retail market.
(ii) Utilities providing electricity to states that have rejected the implementation of 
customer-choice models.
First, I identify states that are moving toward to a competitive retail market and 
states that have regressed. My sample is based on the Retail Energy Deregulation (RED) 
Index, 2nd edition, July 2001, from the Center for the Advancement of Energy Markets. 
The RED Index ranks states (SO states and the District of Columbia) using 22 attributes 
that affect the transition from a monopolistic model to a customer-choice model, and 
measures each state's progress in its development of policies related to retail energy 
competition. A detailed list of the ranks and the index scores for SO states and the 
District of Columbia, along with a list of the attributes used to determine index scores, 
are included in Appendix I, Exhibit 3-1 and 3-2. The index scores used in ranking the 
states are as follows:
(1) An index score of 0 indicates that a state maintains the traditional 
monopolistic model.
(2) An index score of 100 indicates that a state has completely and 
effectively implemented the customer-choice model.
(3) A negative index score indicates that a state explicitly rejects all 
restructuring plans in the retail energy market.
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In order to test the effectiveness of deregulation, I then non-randomly select my 
analysis states from the extreme ends of the ranking distribution. I select utilities from 
states with highest ranking and positive scores (Positive Rank Group) and utilities from 
states with the lowest ranking and negative score (Negative Rank Group). The Positive 
Rank Group consists o f states that are highly deregulated, and the Negative Rank Group 
consists of states that have explicitly rejected all restructuring plans. For instance, 
Pennsylvania is ranked number one among all states with a score of 66, indicating that 
Pennsylvania is implementing a customer-choice model successfully. Texas comes right 
after Pennsylvania with a rank two and score of 65. Nebraska, Colorado, Idaho, 
Alabama, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Mississippi are tied with rank 51 and a score of -8, 
indicating that these states have rejected implementation of a customer-choice model. 
Some states are ranked 28 with a score of 0 because these states have not explicitly 
rejected the idea of restructuring electricity retail markets, yet maintain the traditional 
monopolistic model.
Second, I identify utilities that provide electricity predominantly to the Positive 
Rank Group states and the Negative Rank Group states, but not both, using the following 
criteria:
(1) At least 65% of the revenues of the utility companies come from the 
retail sales of electricity.33
(2) The utilities selected in the Positive Rank Group provide at least 
50% of retail sales of electricity to Positive Rank Group states and 
not more than 5% to the Negative Rank Group states. Similarly, the
33 Some utility companies operate as holding companies with subsidiaries in other businesses, but the 
income from such enterprises is secondary to the income from the sale of electricity. For instance, 32% 
of Otter Tail Corp.'s operating income comes from nonutility subsidiaries.
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utilities selected in the Negative Rank Group provide at least 50% of 
retail sales of electricity to the Negative Rank Group states and not 
more than 5% to the Positive Rank Group states.
(3) The utilities’ stock is publicly traded.
Details of service areas and the percentage of revenues from each service area are 
obtained from the Value Line Investment Survey, Volume 56, 2001. Using the criteria 
stated above, I select three utilities to put into the Positive Rank Group and three utilities 
to put into the Negative Rank Group. This selection procedure is as follows: I first 
identify all utilities that provide electricity to the highest-ranking state, Pennsylvania. 
Three are identified as DQE, Inc., GPU, Inc., and PPL Corporation, but I select only 
DQE, Inc. and PPL Corporation. Even though GPU, Inc., does provide electricity to 
customers in Pennsylvania, 53% of the revenue comes from the sale of electricity to New 
Jersey, which holds a ranking of seven. I then move to the next-highest ranking state, 
Texas, and identify two utilities that meet the criteria: TXU Corp. and El Paso Electric 
Co. Among these four utilities in the Positive Rank Group, El Paso Electric Co. is the 
only one that provides electricity to more than one state: 65% of its revenues come from 
serving Texas, 17% of revenues from serving New Mexico with a positive rank of 
twenty-four, and 18% of revenues from wholesale electricity. Since El Paso Electric Co. 
meets the selection criteria and does not provide electricity to any Negative Rank Group 
state, it is included in the sample. Second, I identify three companies that provide 
electricity to the states with the lowest rank of fifty-one and with the score -8: Idacorp, 
Inc., Cleco Corporation, and Otter Tail Corp. Even though 49% of the retail electricity 
revenues of Otter Tail Corp. comes ftom serving North Dakota and South Dakota with a
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positive rank of 28 and a score of 0, these are states that are still implementing the 
traditional monopolistic model. The inclusion of the Otter Tail Corp. will still provide 
insights of the effectiveness of deregulation; therefore, all three utilities are placed in the 
Negative Rank Group. Third, I examine the financial data of these seven utilities from 
Compact Disclosure and find that the total asset of TXU Corp. is substantially larger 
compared to the rest of the utilities. To alleviate the bias, probably caused by size, TXU 
Corp. is excluded from my sample. As a result, I have included three utilities in the 
Positive Rank Group and three in the Negative Rank Group. Since some companies in 
2001 are the result of mergers and acquisitions in the late 90s, I then identify all 
companies’ predecessors, together with their ticker symbols and exchange information 
through the following three resources: (1) each company’s daily news from April 1 to 
June 30, 1994, from Bloomburg database using the current ticker symbol as the search 
key; (2) the history of each company, when available, listed on its web site; and (3) 
Compact-Disclosure, April-June 1994. As a result, I identify changes in ticker symbols, 
in company names, and in trading exchanges. For instance, El Paso Electric is traded in 
American Stock Exchange using EE as its ticker symbol in 2001, but was exchanged in 
DASDAQ using a different ticker symbol (ELPAQ) in 1994. PPL Corporation has a 
different name, Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., in 1994. The final list of selected 
utilities for the year 2001, together with states they are headquartered in, state rank, total 
assets, and debt-to-equity ratio as of the December 2000 (the year preceding the sample 
period), service areas and corresponding rankings and revenue sources for both groups is 
included in Table la. Table lb shows the corresponding information for all utilities in 
1994.
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Table 1a: List of Utilities and Related Details for 2001
Utility Name Ticker State Headquartered in State Rank in 2001
Total Assets 
(000s)
As of Dec "00
Debt to Equity 
As of Dec'00 Service Area[Rank](% Revenues from Electricity)
DOE. INC. DQE PA 1 3,844,245 1.81 Pittsburgh and municipalities in western Pennsylvania[1]
PPL Corporation PPL PA 1 12,360,000 2.27 Eastern & central Pennsylvania[1]
El Paso Electric Co. EE TX 2 1,660,105 1.88 Western Texas(2](65%), Southern New Mexico[24](17%); wholesale counts 18% of revenues.
Idacorp, Inc. IDA ID 51 4,040,000 1.10 ldaho[51](86%), Oregon[20](4%), Nevada[23](,1%); wholesale counts 9% of revenues.
Cisco Corporation CNL LA 51 1,753,320 1.44 Central Louisiana[51]
Otter Tal Corp. OTTR MN 51 737,708 0.71
Minnesota[51](51% of retail elec. revenues), North Dakota[28](41% of 
retail elec. revenues), South Dakota[28](8% of retail elec. revenues); 
Nonutilify subsidiaries accounted for 32% of '00 operating income.
Source of utilities is the Value Line Investment Survey (Volume 56,2001)
To be included in the sample the following criteria must be met
(1) At least 65% of the revenues of the utilities come from the retail sale of electricity.
(2) The utlities selected in the Positive Rank Group provide at least 50% of their electricity to the Positive Rank Group states and not more than 5% to the Negative Rank Group states. 
The utilities selected in the Negative Rank Group provide at least 50% of their electricity to the Negative Rank Group states and not more than 5% to the Positive Rank Group states.
(3) The unify companies' stock is publicly traded.
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Table 1b: List of Utilities and Related Details for 1994
UtiltyName Ticker State Headquartered in State Rank in 2001
Total Assets 
(000s)
As of Dec S3
Debt to Equity 
As of Dec -93 Service Area(% Revenues from Electricity)
DQE DQE PA 1 4.574.041 1.07 Pittsburgh and municipalities in western Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. PPL PA 1 9,454.113 0.91 Eastern & central Pennsylvania
El Paso Electric Co. ELPAQ TX 2 1,715.406 -5.42 Texas(64%). New Mexico(19%), FERC(17%)
Idaho Power Co. IDA ID 51 2,097,417 0.87 ldaho(87%), Oregon(5%), Nevada(less than 1%); wholesale counts 7% of revenues.
Central Louisiana Electric Co. Inc. CNL LA 51 1,161,635 0.96 Central Louisiana
Otter Tail Power Co. OTTR MN 51 563,905 0.84 Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota; Nonutility subsidiaries accounted for 27% of *93 revenues.
Source of utilities is the Value Line Investment Survey (Volume 49,1994)
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3.2: Data Description for Quotes and Trades
Once utilities are identified, I then gather trades and quotes data for each utility. I
obtain intraday transaction data for bid prices, ask prices, bid sizes (bid volumes), ask
sizes (ask volumes), trading prices, trading sizes (trading volumes), and time of trading 
from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database, New York Stock Exchange, Inc., for the 
sample period of April to June in 1994. The TAQ database contains a trade file and a 
quote file for each stock. The selection of the 2001 data allows me to conduct several 
tests to study the responses to macroeconomic news and idiosyncratic news for the 
Positive Rank Group utilities and the Negative Rank Group utilities, after deregulation 
across states. I also conduct the same tests using sample data from April to June 1994 to 
strengthen my inferences because the 1994 sample conveys information relating the 
responses to news releases before deregulation. For both groups-the Positive Rank 
Group and the Negative Rank Group-I then obtain or calculate the following seven 
variables for each month, day, hour, minute, and second for the sample period from the 
open of trading at 9:30 a.m. to the close of trading at 4:00 p.m. These are the variables:
1. BAS = bid-ask spread = — — * 1000
(ask+ bid)/2
2. BSZ= bid size (based on 100 share units)
3. OSZ = ask size (based on 100 share units)
4. TSZ = trade size (actual number o f shares traded)
5. NOBSm = the number of transactions traded at minute m.
6. TBT = time between trades in seconds
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p
7. RTN5 = ln( —^  )* 100 where P5 is the trading price traded at date d, hour h,
P,.
minute m, and second s  and P,./ is the first price traded preceding the current 
second.
There are 391 minutes between 9:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (including 9:30 a.m.); 
thus, an activity occurring in the first minute after trading starts represents a 9:30 a.m. 
activity, and an activity occurring 391 minutes after trading starts represents a 4:00 p.m. 
activity.
3.3; Macroeconomic News and Idiosyncratic News
In order to compare the responses to economic forces and idiosyncratic news of 
the utilities in 2001 that serve the Positive Rank Group with the utilities that serve the 
Negative Rank Group, and to examine the responses to economic forces and idiosyncratic 
news in 1994, I secure macroeconomic news and idiosyncratic news from DowJones 
Newswires database for the period of April 2 to June 29 of 2001 (63 trading days)34, 
macroeconomic news from Money Market Service and idiosyncratic news from 
Bloomburg for the period of April 1 to June 30 of 1994 (62 trading days). Twenty-two 
major macroeconomic news releases are used as measures of market forces. There are 67 
news announcements for twenty-two types of macroeconomic news during the sample 
period of 2001, whereas there are 68 news announcements for the same types of 
macroeconomic news during the sample period of 1994. I then separate days that have 
news releases from days that do not have any news releases, using a two-step filtering 
procedure.
34 To avoid the contamination o f the electricity crisis occurring in the Western region of the U.S. caused by 
the shortage of electricity in California during the winter of 2000-2001,1 select April-June 2001 after the 
rolling blackout problems were corrected.
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A schematic diagram (Figure 1) illustrates the procedure used to separate 
transaction data from a trade file of any given utility into the announcement days file (the 
AD file), the nonannouncement days file (the NAD file), and the special announcement 
days file (the SAD file). The same procedure also applies to a quote file for any given 
utility. In the first step of separation, I use macroeconomic news releases as the 
separation key. All trades that occur on days having at least one macroeconomic news 
announcement are classified as Macroeconomic Announcement Days (see MAC AD in 
Figure 1). It is possible that these announcement days might include idiosyncratic news. 
If macroeconomic news is released after the close of trading or on holidays, such as Good 
Friday and Memorial Day, or on regular trading days closed for special reasons, I assume 
the impact of this release will be manifested on the next trading day; thus, these (next) 
days are classified as Macroeconomic Special Announcement Days (MACSAD). All 
other days are classified as Macroeconomic Nonannouncement Days (MACNAD). With 
macroeconomic news announcements days in 2001 and 1994, there are 35 
Announcement Days, 27 Nonannouncement Days and one Special Announcement Day in 
2001; there are 38 Announcement Days, 24 Nonannouncement Days, and no Special 
Announcement Days in 1994. A list of macroeconomic news forecasts, actual release 
values, and release times is included in Table 2a for the year 2001 and 2b for the year 
1994.
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Figure 1: A Schematic Diagram of a Two-step Filtering Procedure
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Table 2a: List o f Twentv-two Macroeconomic Announcements Aoril-June 2001
A listing of macroeconomic news forecasts, actual release values, and release times are obtained from the
Dow Jones News Retrieval Service.
Announcement Release Date Release Time Forecast Actual Surprise
Consumer Price Index 17 Apr 8:30 EDT +0.1% +0.1% 0%
16 May 8:30 EDT +0.5% +0.3% -0.2%
15 Jun 8:30 EDT +0.4% +0.4% 0%
Durable Goods Orders 25 Apr 8:30 EDT +0.5% +3.0% +2.5%
25 May 10:00 EDT -2.2% -5.0% -2.8%
26 Jun 8:30 EDT +0.5% +2.9% +2.4%
Gross Domestic Product 27 Apr 8:30 EDT +1.0% Q1A +2.0% +1.0%
25 May 8:30 EDT +1.4% Q1P +1.3% -0.1%
29 Jun 8:30 EDT +1.2% Q1F +1.2% 0%
Producer Price Index 12 Apr 8:30 EDT 0% -0.1% -0.1%
11 May 8:30 EDT +0.4% +0.3% -0.1%
14 Jun 8:30 EDT +0.3% +0.1% -0.2%
Hourly Earnings 6 Apr 8:30 EDT +0.3% +0.4% +0.1%
4 May 8:30 EDT +0.4% +0.4% 0%
1 Jun 8:30 EDT +0.3% +0.28% -0.02%
NonFarm Payroll 6 Apr 8:30 EDT +60,000 -86,000 -146,000
4 May 8:30 EDT +25,000 -223,000 -248,000
1 Jun 8:30 EDT -25,000 -19,000 +6,000
Unemployment Rate 6 Apr 8:30 EDT 4.3% 4.3% 0%
4 May 8:30 EDT 4.4% 4.5% +0.1%
1 Jun 8:30 EDT 4.6% 4.4% -0.2%
Housing Starts 17 Apr 8:30 EDT -1.3%(1.613m) -1.3%( 1.625m) 0%
16 May 8:30 EDT -0.8%(1.6m) +1.5%(1.609m) +2.3%
19 Jun 8:30 EDT -0.6%(1.6m) -0.4%( 1.622m) +0.2%
Retail Sales 12 Apr 8:30 EDT +0.1% -0.2% -0.3%
11 May 8:30 EDT +0.2% +0.8% +0.6%
13 Jun 8:30 EDT +0.1% +0.1% 0%
Trade Deficit (Gap) 18 Apr 8:30 EDT $32.6 bn $26.99 bn -$5.61bn
18 May 8:30 EDT $29 bn $33.08 bn $4.08 bn
21 Jun 8:30 EDT $31 bn $32.17 bn $1.17 bn
Leading Indicators 18 Apr 10:00 EDT -0.3% -0.3% 0%
17 May 10:00 EDT +0.1% +0.1% 0%
20 Jun 10:00 EDT +0.3% +0.5% +0.2%
Personal Income 30 Apr 8:30 EDT +0.4% +0.5% +0.1%
29 May 8:30 EDT +0.2% +0.3% +0.1%
Personal Expenditures 30 Apr 8:30 EDT +0.2% +0.3% +0.1%
29 May 8:30 EDT +0.4% +0.4% 0%
Capacity Utilization 17 Apr 9:15 EDT 79.1% 79.4% +0.3%
14 May 9:15 EDT 78.9% 78.5% -0.4%
15 Jun 9:15 EDT 77.9% 77.4% -0.5%
Surprise is the difference between the value released by the governmental (private) agency and the 
forecasted value.
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Table 2a: List o f Twenty-two Macroeconomic Announcements April-June 2001
A listing of macroeconomic news forecasts, actual release values, and release times are obtained from the
Dow Jones News Retrieval Service.
Announcement Release Date Release Time Forecast Actual Surprise
Industrial Production 17 Apr 9:15 EDT -0.1% +0.4% +0.5%
14 May 9:15 EDT -0.3% -0.3% 0%
15 Jun 9:15 EDT -0.4% -0.6% -0.2%
Construction Spending 2 Apr 10:00 EDT +0.3% +0.6% +0.3%
1 May 10:00 EDT +0.5% +1.3% +0.8%
1 Jun 10:00 EDT 0% +0.3% +0.3%
Factory Orders 3 Apr 10:00 EDT -3.8% (TTE) -0.4% +2.8%
2 May 10:00 EDT +1.5% +1.8% +0.3%
5 Jun 10:00 EDT -2.8% -3.0% -0.2%
NAPM Survey 2 Apr 10:00 EDT 42.3 43.1 0.8
4 Apr 10:00 EDT Non-Mfg 50.3 No
1 May 10:00 EDT 44.0 43.2 -0.8
3 May 10:00 EDT Non-Mfg 47.1 Yes
1 Jun 10:00 EDT 43.5 42.1 -1.4
5 Jun 10:00 EDT Non-Mfg 46.6 No
Business Inventories 13 Apr 8:30 EDT -0.1% - 0.2% -0.1%
14 May 8:30 EDT -0.2% (TTE) - 0.3% -0.1%
14 Jun 8:30 EDT +0.1% 0.0% -0.1%
US Treasury Budget 19 Apr 15:49 EDT Summary -$50,662 bn
18 May 15:13 EDT Summary $189,796 bn
20 Jun 15:07 EDT Summary -$27,919 bn
Consumer Credit 6 Apr 15:00 EDT $16.0 bn (TTE) $13.5 bn -$2.5 bn
7 May 15:00 EDT $9.8 bn (TTE) $6.16 bn -$3.64 bn
7 Jun 15:00 EDT $9.0 bn (TTE) $13.9 bn +$3.9 bn
New Home Sales 25 Apr 10:00 EDT 910,000 1,021,000 +111,000
24 May 10:00 EDT 975,000 894,000 -81,000
26 Jun 10:00 EDT 900,000 928,000 +28,000
Surprise is the difference between the value released by the governmental (private) agency and the 
forecasted value.
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Table 2b: List o f Twentv-two Macroeconomic Announcements Aoril-June 1994
A listing of macroeconomic news forecasts, actual release values, and release times are obtained from the
Money Market Service.
Announcement Release Date Release Time Forecast Actual Surmise
Consumer Price Index 13 Apr 8:30 EDT +0.3% +0.3% 0%
13 May 8:30 EDT +0.3% +0.1% -0.2%
14 Jun 8:30 EDT +0.3% +0.2% -0.1%
Durable Goods Orders 28 Apr 8:30 EDT +1.0% +0.4% -0.6%
25 May 8:30 EDT +1.0% +0.1% -0.9%
23 Jun 8:30 EDT +0.5% +0.9% +0.4%
Gross Domestic Product 28 Apr 8:30 EDT +3.3% Q1A +2.6% -0.7%
27 May 8:30 EDT +2.5% Q1P +3.0% +0.5%
29 Jun 8:30 EDT +3.0% Q1F +3.4% +0.4%
Producer Price Index 12 Apr 8:30 EDT +0.2% +0.2% 0%
12 May 8:30 EDT +0.2% -0.1% -0.3%
10 Jun 8:30 EDT +0.2% -0.1% -0.3%
Hourly Earnings 1 Apr 8:30 EDT +0.3% +0.1% -0.2%
6 May 8:30 EDT +0.2% +0.3% +0.1%
3 Jim 8:30 EDT +0.3% +0.5% +0.2%
NonFarm Payroll 1 Apr 8:30 EDT +79,500 +239,000 +159,500
6 May 8:30 EDT -54,500 -189,000 -134,500
3 Jun 8:30 EDT +100,000 -76,000 -176,000
Unemployment Rate 1 Apr 8:30 EDT 6.5% 6.5% 0%
6 May 8:30 EDT 6.5% 6.4% -0.1%
3 Jun 8:30 EDT 6.4% 6.0% -0.4%
Housing Starts 20 Apr 8:30 EDT +7.58%( 1.42m) +12.21 %(1.47m)+4.63%
17 May 8:30 EDT +2.11%(1.45m) -0.68%( 1.46m) -2.79%
16 Jun 8:30 EDT -1.38%( 1.43m) +3.42%(1.51m) +4.8%
Retail Sales 13 Apr 8:30 EDT +1.0% +0.4% -0.6%
12 May 8:30 EDT +0.3% -0.8% -1.1%
14 Jun 8:30 EDT 0% -0.2% -0.2%
Trade Balance 19 Apr 8:30 EDT -$9.25 bn -$12.40 bn -$3.15 bn
19 May 8:30 EDT -$11.5 bn -$10.1 bn +$1.4 bn
21 Jun 8:30 EDT -$10.5 bn -$12 bn -$1.5 bn
Leading Indicators 5 Apr 10:00 EDT -0.2% -0.1% +0.1%
3 May 10:00 EDT +0.6% +0.7% +0.1%
2 Jun 10:00 EDT 0% 0% 0%
Personal Income 1 Apr 8:30 EDT +0.8% +1.3% +0.5%
29 Apr 8:30 EDT +0.7% +0.6% -0.1%
31 May 8:30 EDT +0.45% +0.4% -0.05%
30 Jun 8:30 EDT +0.6% +0.6% 0%
Personal Expenditures 1 Apr 8:30 EDT +0.7% +1.0% +0.3%
29 Apr 8:30 EDT +0.5% +0.4% -0.1%
31 May 8:30 EDT +0.1% -0.1% -0.2%
30 Jun 8:30 EDT +0.2% +0.4% +0.2%
Capacity Utilization 15 Apr 9:15 EDT 83.8% 83.6% -0.2%
16 May 9:15 EDT 83.7% 83.6% -0.1%
15 Jun 9:15 EDT 83.5% 83.5% 0%
Surprise is the difference between the value released by the governmental (private) agency and the 
forecasted value.
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Table 2b: List o f Twentv-two Macroeconomic Announcements April-June 1994
A listing of macroeconomic news forecasts, actual release values, and release times are obtained from the
Money Market Service.
Announcement Release Date Release Time Forecast Actual Surmise
Industrial Production 15 Apr 9:15 EDT +0.7% +0.5% -0.2%
16 May 9:15 EDT +0.3% +0.3% 0%
15 Jun 9:15 EDT +0.1% +0.2% +0.1%
Construction Spending 1 Apr 10:00 EDT +0% -1.2% -1.2%
2 May 10:00 EDT +2.0% +0.8% -1.2%
1 Jun 10:00 EDT +1.0% +0.6% -0.4%
Factory Orders 4 May 10:00 EDT +0.5% +1.1% +0.6%
2 Jun 10:00 EDT +0.3% -0.1% -0.4%
30 Jun 10:00 EDT +0.6% +0.6% 0%
NAPM Survey 4 Apr 10:00 EDT 58.0 56.7 -1.3
2 May 10:00 EDT 56.5 57.7 +1.2
1 Jun 10:00 EDT 57.2 57.7 +0.5
Business Inventories 14 Apr 8:30 EDT +0.3% +0.5% +0.2%
13 May 8:30 EDT +0.2% -0.2% -0.4%
15 Jun 8:30 EDT +0.3% +0.2% -0.1%
US Treasury Budget 21 Apr 15:00 EDT -$35 bn -$32.30 bn +$2.70 bn
20 May 15:00 EDT $17 bn $17.40 bn +$0.40 bn
21 Jun 15:00 EDT -$32.25 bn -$32.10 bn +$0.15 bn
Consumer Credit 7 Apr 15:00 EDT $6.5 bn $3.5 bn -$3.0 bn
6 May 15:00 EDT $4.8 bn $7.4 bn +$2.6 bn
7 Jun 15:00 EDT $5.6 bn $8.9 bn +$3.3 bn
New Home Sales 29 Apr 10:00 EDT 700,000 739,000 +39,000
31 May 10:00 EDT 725,000 683,000 -42,000
28 Jun 10:00 EDT 679,000 738,000 +59,000
Surprise is the difference between the value released by the governmental (private) agency and the 
forecasted value.
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Even though Macroeconomic Nonannouncement Days are free of macroeconomic 
news, it is possible, and very likely, that idiosyncratic news announcements are released 
during these days too. These nonannouncement days are then subjected to a second filter 
that divides them into days that have at least one company announcement (COMAD) and 
days that have no company or macroeconomic announcement (NAD). To incorporate 
idiosyncratic news release days into Announcement Days, I first classify idiosyncratic 
news into two groups: Primary News and Secondary News. Primary News includes 
firms’ earnings forecasts, earnings surprises, earnings announcements, dividends 
announcements, merger and acquisition related news, stock splits and buyback news, and 
regulatory news. Secondary News refers to subsidiary news, industry-wide news, and 
cross-firms, and competitors* news. I assume that the primary news released during the 
morning before trading starts or during trading time produces a major impact on stock 
prices; therefore, I include it in Company Announcement Days (COMAD). Secondary 
News and Primary News released the preceding day(s) before trading time or on holidays 
are assumed to produce a minor impact on stock prices; therefore, I include them in 
Company Special Announcement Days (COMSAD). Thus, Macroeconomic 
Nonannouncement Days show neither macroeconomic news announcements nor any 
company-specific primary or secondary news announcements and are named 
Nonannouncement Days (NAD). I then merge Macroeconomic Announcement Days 
(MACAD) and Company Announcement Days (COMAD) into Announcement Days 
(AD), and Macroeconomic Special Announcement Days and Company Special 
Announcement Days into Special Announcement Days (SAD). After the two-step 
filtering procedure, each utility has different sets of Announcement Days (AD file),
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Special Announcement Days (SAD file), and Nonannouncement Days (NAD file) for the 
years 1994 and 2001.
The Nonannouncement Days (NADs) are used as a control group in many of my 
testing procedures. To avoid any contaminating effects, I discard the SAD file and 
compare only the responses of stock prices to exogenous impact from macroeconomic 
news and primary idiosyncratic news between the AD file and the NAD file in 1994 and 
2001, respectively, for all six utilities. A list of company-specific news and release times 
is included in Table 3.
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Table 3a: Company-specific News for Utilities April-June 2001
News releases for all six utilities for the period April 1, 2001 to June 30, 2001 on the Dow Jones News 
Retrieval Service (DJNS) are tracked. Forward-looking Information in the releases is categorized into three 
types - regulatory [R], primary [P] and secondary [S]. Regulatory information includes all information 
relating to regulation in the industry. Primary information includes all information relating to earnings, 
dividends, mergers and acquisitions, stock splits, and buybacks. Secondary information includes 
subsidiary, industry, cross-firm, competitor, and other information not included in the primary category. In 
the category of other information, included are information releases that provide unconfirmed information 
and information unlikely to have an impact on stock prices. Information is also identified by release time. 
Information released during trading hours (9:30 a.m EST - 4:00 p.m. EST) is denoted by [T], information 
released in the morning before trading is denoted [1], information released i days before a trading day is
denoted -/ where i= l,2 ,3 , Primary information is denoted by [P], regulatory information is denoted by
[R], and secondary information is denoted by [S]. For example, information that is secondary and released 
the night before a trading day will be denoted [S,-l].
DOE. Inc.. (Deregulated! 
Date Time 
30 Apr 18:44 ET 
15 May 15:55 ET 
24 May 16:07 ET
PPL Corn. (Deregulated)
Date 
24 Apr 
24 Apr 
24 Apr 
24 Apr 
24 Apr
Time 
15:43 ET 
15:43 ET 
15:46 ET 
15:49 ET 
16:11 ET
15 June 23:48 ET
Details
IQ net 22c a share vs. 82c [P,-l]
Sparkling Water buys Pure Water, Polaris from DQE. [S,T] 
Quarterly regular dividend 42c, payable 7/1/01, record 6/8 [P,-l]
Details
IQ Net $ 1.52/share [P,T]
PPL to securitize U.S. Electricity Delivery Co. [P,T]
PPL maintains $1.06/share annual dividend [P,T]
PPL to separate PPL electric utilities [P,T]
First Call produced a mean earnings estimate of $3.66 a share for 2001 and 
$4.01 for 2002. [P,-l]
PPL registered a 54% gain in IQ net income, to $222M, or $1.52 a share, from 
$142M, or 99 cents, a year earlier, as operating revenues climbed to $1.6B, from 
$1.4B. For the current quarter, the consensus of analyst estimates reported by 
First Call runs to 77 cents a share, up from 64 cents in last year's June quarter. 
[P>-3]
El Paso Electric (Deregulated!
Date Time Details
23 Apr 6:01 ET IQ Oper Net 36c a diluted share. [P,l]
Idacoro. Inc. /Regulated)
Date Time Details
4 May 5:00 ET IQ Net 93c a share vs. $1.12. [P,l]
4 May 5:07 ET On May 1, 2001, the Idaho Public Utility Commission granted Idaho Power
Company a S168.3M PCA rate increase effective immediately. The balance of 
the original request, $59.1M, has been deferred pending a formal hearing. It is 
expected that an order will be issued by August 23,2001. [R,l]
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Cleco Coro. (Regulated)
Date Time Details
2 Apr 14:34 ET Cleco sells electric power unit assets to Quanta Svc. [P,T]
27 Apr 15:18 ET Cleco stock split approved by shareholders. Cleco boosts regular quarterly
dividend to 43.5c from 42.5c [P,T]
1 May 16:17 ET IQ Net continuous ops 51c a share vs. 46c [P,-l]
Otter Tail Corp. (Regulated!
Date Time Details
10 Apr 14:59 ET Otter declares 26c regular quarterly dividend. [P,T]
23 Apr 17:02 ET IQ Net 45c/share vs. 43c/share. [P,-l]
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Table 3b: Company-specific News for Utilities April-June 1994
News releases pertaining to all six utilities for the period April 1,1994 to June 30,1994 on the Bloomberg 
Professional Service are tracked. Forward-looking Information in the releases is categorized into three 
types - regulatory [R], primary [P] and secondary [S]. Regulatory information includes all information 
relating to regulation in the industry. Primary information includes all information relating to earnings, 
dividends, mergers and acquisitions, stock splits, and buybacks. Secondary information includes 
subsidiary, industry, cross-firm, competitor, and other information not included in the primary category. In 
the category o f other information, included are information releases that provide unconfirmed information 
and information unlikely to have an impact on stock prices. Information is also identified by release time. 
Information released during trading hours (9:30 a.m. EST - 4:00 p.m. EST) is denoted by [T], information 
released in the morning before trading is denoted [1], information released i days before a trading day is
denoted where /=1,2,3, Primary information is denoted by [P], regulatory information is denoted by
[R], and secondary information is denoted by [S]. For example, information that is secondary and released 
the night before a trading day will be denoted [S,-l].
DOE. Inc..
Date Time Details
15 Apr 16:08 EDT DQE issued earnings. Three months ended March 31: EPS $0.70 vs. $0.65,
Dividend per share $0.42 vs. $0.40; Twelve months ended March 31: EPS 
$2.77 vs. $2.68, Dividend per share $1.64 vs. $1.56; Duquesne Light Co.'s total 
sales to customers: three months ended March 31: 3.1 billion vs. 2.99 billion a 
year age. [P,-3]
10 May 13:29 EDT Duquesne Capital L. P. filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission to 
sell as much as $150 million o f preferred securities and plans to lend the 
proceeds to its parent company, Duquesne Light Co., in exchange for monthly 
income subordinated debentures. Duquesne Light, a unit of DQE Co., will in 
turn use the proceeds to repay, redeem or purchase its outstanding 
securities.[S,T]
24 May 14:03 EDT Quarterly dividend $.42, payable 7/1/94, record 6/10 [P,T]
28June 13:13 EDT Quarterly dividend for preference stock $.70, payable 10/1/94, record 9/9 [P,T]
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
Date Time Details
27 Apr 10:03 EDT Pennsylvania Power & Light (Ticker: PPL) reported 12 months earnings ended
March 31 $2.07 vs. $2.04; sales to service-area customers rose 5.5% in the 12 
months ended March 31. For the IQ earnings: 70 cents vs. the same earnings a 
year ago. Since NYSE was closed on April 27 due to the funeral of Richard M. 
Nixon, the impact of this news would be on the next trading day, April 28. [P,- 
!]•
20 May 09:37 EDT PPL was cut to intermediate and long-term "neutral" from "above average" by
Merrill Lynch & Co. analyst Doris Kelley. The analyst estimates the utility will 
earn from $2.05 to $2.10 per share in 1994, and from $1.9 to $2.05 per share in 
1995. The analyst said the company’s $1.2 increase in the annual dividend in 
February will "be the last dividend increase for the next several year,". [P,T]
25 May 16:04 EDT PPL declared the regular quarterly dividend of 41.75 cents, payable 7/1, record
6/10. Quarterly dividends on its preferred stock are also declared. [P,-1 ]
27 May 10:32 EDT PPL was lowered to "underperform" from "neutral" today at Kidder, Peabody &
Co. by analyst Steven Fleishman because of a poor outlook for both earnings 
and dividend growth, "in our opinion, the current stock price does not reflect the 
company's declining earnings outlook and lack of dividend prospects going 
forward,” Fleishman wrote in a report. Kidder forecasts operating earnings will 
fall to $2.05 a share this year and $1.95 a share in 1995 from last year's $2.19. 
Earnings are expected to suffer again in 1996.[P,T]
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El Paso Electric 
Date Time 
7 Apr 20:03 EDT
18 May 17:18 EDT 
23 May 14:47 EDT
Idacoro Power Inc. 
Date Time 
2 May 7:21 EDT
30 June 15:38 EDT
Details
El Paso Electric could end up paying $53 million to attorneys, advisers and 
mediators in its bankruptcy reorganization case if a judge approves bonuses 
sought today. [P,-l]
EE reported a net loss of 37 cents vs. $3.2 a year ago. [P,-l]
Central and South West Corporation proposed a rate plan that will extend a 
freeze in electric base rates for customers of El Paso Electric in Southern New 
Mexico and will reduce current rates for more than 8,200 low-income 
households once Central and South West's pending merger with El Paso Electric 
is completed. It is an effort to retain the right to supply power to the city of Las 
Cruces. [P,l]
Details
IQ earnings 44 cents vs. 55 cents. The company has proposed a one-year 2.5% 
power cost adjustment, which would generate an estimated $9.8 million in 
additional revenue during the 12-month period beginning May 16. [P,l]
Idaho Power filed its first general rate increase request with the Idaho PUC since 
1985 in order to make customers' rates more reflective of nine years worth of 
changes in company costs, investments and expenses. [P,T]
Central Louisiana Electric Co. Inc.
Date Time 
22 Apr 14:02 EDT
2 May 16:01 EDT
Otter Tail Power Corp. 
Date Time 
20 Apr 17:25 EDT
Details
Central Louisiana Electric Co. increased its quarterly cash dividend to 36.5 cents 
a share from 35.5 cents, payable 5/15, record 5/2. The board also declared 
regular quarterly dividends on all issues of preferred stock. A dividend 
reinvestment plan is available which allows dividends on its common preferred 
stock to be reinvested in additional shares of common stock at market price, 
without commission costs. [P,T]
IQ earnings 36 cents vs. 31 cents. 12 months ended March 31: $1.83 vs. $1.95; 
EPS (diluted) $1.77 vs. $1.88. [P,-l]
Details
IQ earnings 78 cents vs. 75 cents [P,-l]
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3.4 Research Design.
3.4.1: Testing the Difference of Means and Variances
For information purposes, I use a two-sample t-test to determine whether the 
market reacts differently to macroeconomic news and/or idiosyncratic news, in terms of 
bid-ask spread (BAS), bid size (BSZ), ask size (OSZ), trading size (TSZ), the number of 
transactions traded per minute at minute m (NOBSm), time between trades in seconds 
(TBT) and return expressed as percentage for second s (RTNS). There is no a priori 
expectation on the means of other variables, except for the number of transactions per 
minute. The mean of the number of transactions per minute (NOBS) from the AD file 
should be significantly larger than that from the NAD file.
3.4.2: Testing the Equality of Variances in Returns
Ross (1989) maintains that the arrival of information has direct impact on the 
volatility of stock prices in an arbitrage-free environment. In order to observe the stock 
return responses to release news, I employ the Brown-Forsythe-Modified Levene (BFL) 
test to examine the volatility differences between days with released news and days 
without released news. Levene (1960) proposed a statistical test measuring the equality 
of variances with equal sample sizes. Later, Draper and Hunter (1969) generalized 
Levene’s method to apply to samples with unequal observations. However, Brown and 
Forsythe (1974) point out that Draper and Hunter’s statistic is not robust if the underlying 
populations are skewed. So instead of using the absolute deviations from its group mean 
as proposed by Levene (1960), Brown and Forsythe (1974) replace them with the 
absolute deviations from its group median. Conover, Johnson, and Johnson (1981)
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compare more than fifty methods for testing the equality of variances and conclude that 
the Brown and Forsythe (1974) modified Levene (1960) (BFL) F-statistic test is among 
the most powerful and is, in face, the most robust in departures from normality. This test 
has been used to test the equality of variances of returns in stock market (Lockwood and 
Linn 1990) and futures markets (Ederington and Lee 1993, Christie-David and Chaudhry 
2000, Aggarwal et al. 2001, Christie-David et al. 2002). For these reasons, I follow this 
line of research to examine the equality of variances of returns in the stock market, using 
the BFL F-statistic.
First, I examine the overall equality of the variances between the AD file and the 
NAD file for each company, using second-by-second stock returns for all trading days in 
1994 and 2001, respectively. Thus, the larger the F value (the Overall F value), the more 
significant the difference between the variances of returns of Announcement Days and 
Nonannouncement Days. If deregulation is indeed effective, then the F values for the 
year 1994 are, on the average, smaller than those for the year 2001. Furthermore, not 
only do the variances of returns between Announcement Days and Nonannouncement 
Days for the year 2001 show differences, but also the variance of returns of 
Announcement Days is greater than the variance of returns of Nonannouncement Days 
for the year 2001 for a utility serving the Positive Rank Group states. Conversely, a 
company serving the Negative Rank Group states shows no difference between the 
variances of returns of Announcement Days and Nonannouncement Days or the variance 
of returns on Announcement Days is less than the variance of returns on 
Nonannouncement Days for the year 2001. Moreover, the F values of the companies in
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the Positive Rank Group providing electricity to highly deregulated states are expected to 
be higher, on the average, than those from the Negative Rank Group.
Brown-Forsvthe-Modified Levene Test Statistic (BFL)
YdnJ(Dl -~ D .^ (N -J )
Test statistic: F«> = —---------------------------  (1)
---------------------------------------------------  J  ")  ______ '  '
M  j= i
where Fcai follows an F distribution with J-l and N-J degrees of freedom. Reject 
Ho if Fcai > F(l-a; J-l, N-J) (Neter et al. 1996).
D,j =\Ry ~M j = the absolute deviations from its group median
j  =1 for the AD file and j - 2  for the NAD file 
J = 1 , 2 , 3 ,  ns
n\j = the number of the absolute deviations from its group median in j group 
N = ny + tl2
J =2  indicating there are two groups: the AD group and the NAD group
p
Rsj= In ( ——) ”Second-By-Second” stock return from group j  where s = 1, 2, 
P5-1
3,....ny. In the instance when more than one transaction occurs at the same 
second, Ps-i is the first price traded from previous second.
A
Mj = the sample median return computed over the ny returns in j  group.
»r-±1=1
V
KnJJ
= the mean absolute deviation from the median for group j.
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■ the grand mean absolute deviation.
3.4.3: Testing the Effects of Macroeconomic News on Returns
Ross (1989) maintains that the arrival of information has direct impact on the 
volatility of stock prices in an arbitrage-free environment. Using the NAD file as a 
control, filtering out random effects, the results of BFL test provide insights into the 
effectiveness of deregulation. If one of the objectives of deregulation, that is, making the 
utility operations more responsive to market forces, is actually met, then the F-values for 
utilities in Positive Rank Group should be larger, on the average, than the F-values for 
utilities in the Negative Rank Group. However, in order to build robustness into my 
findings, I perform regressions on return volatility for each utility, thereby 
complementing my comparison between utilities that provide electricity to the Positive 
Rank Group states and those that provide electricity to the Negative Rank Group states. 
The measure of volatility (osc) is the absolute excess return for a given utility c at second 
s. Based on priors and findings in the literature, several independent variables have 
impacted the volatility of returns, in addition to macroeconomic news such as 
idiosyncratic news, buy-sell indicator, trading volume, bid-ask spread, the sign of return, 
and time between trades. Thus, I regress volatility on a dummy variable for 
macroeconomic news, as well as these independent variables too.
Patell and Wolfson (1984) find that it takes only five to ten minutes to adjust 
security prices in response to earnings and dividend information. Ederington and Lee 
(1993) examine the impact of macroeconomic news announcements on the interest rate 
and foreign exchange futures markets and conclude that the majority of the price
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adjustments occur within the first minute of trading after a news announcement and that 
high volatility remains for at least fifteen minutes after an announcement and remains 
slightly elevated for several hours. Based on the literature, it is reasonable to assume that 
the major impact of news, both macroeconomic news and idiosyncratic news, on stock 
prices lasts for at most one hour. With this in mind, I set the dummy variable DMAC to 
1 for all time periods within sixty minutes from the time of the macroeconomic news 
release. Similarly, I set up a dummy variable DIDIO for idiosyncratic news. I assign 1 
to DIDIO for all time periods within sixty minutes from the time of the idiosyncratic 
news release. It is possible, and very likely, that macroeconomic news and idiosyncratic 
news release around the same time; therefore, if DMACRO and DIDIO are both set to be 
1, indicating there is an impact to returns from both macroeconomic news and 
idiosyncratic news; therefore, I reassign DMACRO and DIDIO to be 0.5. Otherwise, 
DMACRO and DIDIO are to be 0. I set DMACRO (DIDIO) at 1 for the period from 
9:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. if there is macroeconomic news (idiosyncratic news) announced 
before trading opens at 9:30 a.m. If there are macroeconomic news and idiosyncratic 
news announcements before trading opening on the same day, I set DMACRO and 
DIDIO at 0.5 respectively for the period from 9:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m.
With the characteristics of market microstructure, many other variables are added 
in the regression model to capture the dynamic features of return volatility. Hausman, 
Lo, and MacKinlay (1992) suggest that the buy-sell indicator, the volume, the past price 
changes, the bid-ask spread, and the time between trades all affect price changes; 
therefore, I employ a buy-sell indicator (BSI), a standardized volume measure (VOL), the 
interaction of bid-ask spread and return volatility from the previous transaction
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(lag(BASs-i*as)), the interaction of bid-ask spread, the return volatility, and the sign of 
return from the previous transaction (lag(BASs-i*os*Is‘)), and the time between trades 
(TBT). The use of a standardized volume measure (VOL) and a buy-sell indicator are 
used as a control for bid-ask bounce. The time between trades (TBT) is a measure of 
liquidity to explain some of the return volatility.
Following Blume, MacKinlay, and Terker (1989) and Hausman, Lo, and 
MacKinlay (1992), a transaction occurring at time s is buyer-initiated or at the ask if the 
trading price for that transaction is greater than the average of the prevailing bid quote 
and the prevailing ask quote. A transaction occurring at time s is seller-initiated or at the 
bid if the trading price is less than the average of the prevailing bid quote and the 
prevailing ask quote. I follow the suggestion of Lee and Ready (1991) and Hausman, Lo, 
and MacKinlay (1992) that using the prevailing quotes (ask and bid) occurring at least 
five seconds before the current transaction will account for most of mismatching trade 
prices to bid/ask quotes. The buy-sell indicator is set at 1 if the trading price is buyer- 
initiated, -1 if it is seller-initiated, and 0 if it is equal to the average of the prevailing bid- 
and-ask prices.
Copeland and Galai (1983) maintain that the bid-ask spread and price volatility 
are positively related. The interaction of bid-ask spread and return volatility from the 
previous transaction (lag(BAS,.i*as)) and the interaction of bid-ask spread, the return 
volatility, and the sign of return from the previous transaction (lag(BASs-i*os*Is )) are 
designed to reflect the return volatility caused by bid-ask spread. Taking lagged terms 
into account for serial dependencies, I* is an indicator variable which is set to be 1 if the 
contemporaneous return is negative and 0 otherwise.
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Regression Test for Each Utility
<jx =a0 + a tDMACx + a2DIDIOx + a}BSIx + ayOLx
+ aJaglBAS^ * <r,) + a,lag(BAS,.lr * a w* I _ )  + a,TBTlt + e,t (2)
1. c = 1,2,3,4,5,6 where c is an index for identifying each utility.
p
2. Rsc= ln(—S£-)*100 where P5C is the trading price traded at date d, hour h,
s^-lx
minute m, and second s and P5./.c is the first price traded preceding the current 
second.
3. Rc= the average return for a given utility c.
4. a  =SC Rsc - /? J  = the absolute excess return for a given utility c for second s.
5. DMACsc —
1
0.5 where DMACsc =1 for all s < 3600 seconds from time of 
0
macroeconomic news release; DMACsc =0.5 if there exists s<3600 seconds 
from time of idiosyncratic news; 0 otherwise.
6. DIDIOsc =
1
0.5 where DIDIOsc =1 for all s < 3600 seconds from time of 
0
macroeconomic news release; DIDIOsc =0.5 if there exists s<3600 seconds 
from time of macroeconomic news; 0 otherwise.
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7. BSIsc = Buy-Sell Indicator for the 5th second.
1 V K  > \  i AsK -u  + B i d s - i c )  * buyer-initiated
0 IfPx = — (Ask^]c + Bid^Xc) , indeterminate
-1  IfP sc < (Asks_] c +Bids_l c) , seller-initiaed
Where Asks-i.c, ask quote, and Bid5./.c, bid quote, are the first occurrence 
quoted at least five seconds before the 5th second.
TSZ8. VOLsc = ---- — = Standardized trading volume for the 5th second.
TSZC
= the volume of the trade at the sAth second divided by the total volume 
for a given utility c.
9. BASs U = ask’- '~ bld'-' *1000
'- ,f (asks_x + bids_x) / 2
= the first bid-ask spread quoted at least five seconds before the 5th 
second.
1io. r , = q  where T = 1 if the contemporaneous return is negative and 0
otherwise.
11. TBT. = time between trades occurred at second s-1 and second s.
SC
Correction for Autocorrelation and Heteroscedasticitv
When time series data are employed in regression analyses, it is necessary to 
determine if  there are autocorrelation and/or heteroscedasticity problems. I use the
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following procedures to detect the existence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity 
problems and, when these occur, to correct them.
10. Regress crsc on its lag and use the Durbin h-test to detect the presence of first-
order autocorrelation.
11. Once the autocorrelation is identified, I then run a stepwise autoregression 
model, using Maximum Likelihood method. The stepwise autoregression 
method initially fits a high-order model with many autoregressive lags and 
then sequentially removes those that are not significant. This procedure also 
helps in determining the order of autocorrelation.
12. Use Lagrange Multiplier to test heteroscedasticity.
13. Based on the stepwise autoregression model and Lagrange Multiplier results, I 
then determine the order of autocorrelation. If a high-order of autocorrelation 
exists, then GARCH(p,q) is used to correct autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity; otherwise, GARCH(q) is used to correct the 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
GARCH (p. al Regression Model
y, =x,P+u, (3)
”, ..... (4)
(5)
(6)
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL RESULT
4.1: Summary Statistics
For statistical analysis of the seven variables (see Tables 4a and 4b), I use a two- 
sample t-test to measure the market’s movement as it reacts to macroeconomic news and 
to idiosyncratic news, both in terms of the seven variables for the years 1994 and 2001: 
bid-ask spread (BAS), bid size (BSZ), ask size (SZ), trading size (SZ), the number of 
transactions traded per minute at minute m (NOBSm), time between trades in seconds 
(TBT), and return expressed as percentage for second s (RTNS).
The analysis provides substantial information. For instance, the BAS in 2001 is 
always larger on announcement days than on nonannouncement days for utilities in the 
Positive Rank Group. Conversely, the BAS in 2001 for utilities in the Negative Rank 
Group is always smaller on announcement days than on nonannouncement days, except 
for the Otter Tail Corp. Using DQE, Inc., (deregulated) and Idacorp, Inc., (regulated) as 
examples, I find that the ratio for DQE, Inc., is 1.0292, suggesting that the BAS on 
announcements days is 2.92% larger, on the average, than the BAS on nonannouncement 
days, a statistic that is significant at a 1% level. But the ratio for Idacorp, Inc., is 0.9451, 
indicating that the BAS on announcement days is, on the average, 5.49% smaller than the
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BAS on nonannouncement days, where again the difference shows a 1% level of 
significance. The BAS ratios in 2001 indicate that BAS tends to be larger on 
announcement days for deregulated utilities and smaller on announcement days for 
regulated utilities, with one exception, the Otter Tail Corp. The BAS ratios in 1994 (see 
Table 4b) show that there is no difference between the BAS on announcement days and 
the BAS on nonannouncement days, with one exception: the BAS of PPL on 
announcement days is smaller at a 10% level of significance. Copeland and Galai (1983) 
suggest that bid-ask spread and price volatility are positively related; therefore, my 
findings may suggest that deregulated utilities are more responsive to the arrival of news 
with larger spreads because of the risk associated with the news releases.
Bid size and offer size exhibit varied findings. Bid sizes are larger on 
announcement days than on nonannouncement days for utilities in the Positive Rank 
Group, with the difference being significant at a 1% level of significance. Conversely, 
bid sizes are smaller on announcement days than on nonannouncement days for utilities 
in the Negative Rank Group, with one exception, Idacorp, Inc. Although the bid size of 
Idacorp, Inc., is larger on announcement days, the figures are not significant. However, 
offer sizes are consistently larger on announcement days than on nonannouncement days, 
with the difference being significant at a 1% level for all utilities in 2001. The bid sizes 
and offer sizes in 1994 do not provide any systematic findings.
Like the offer sizes, the number of transactions per minute presents strong and 
systematic evidence that there are more transactions occurring on announcements days 
than on nonannouncement days for all utilities in 2001 and 1994, with the difference 
being significant at a 1% level of significance, except for the Otter Tail Corp. in 2001,
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with no significance, and Central Louisiana Electric Co., Inc., in 1994 with a 10% level 
of significance. The statistics for trade sizes do not present a systematic pattern. 
However, the time between trades on announcement days is smaller than the time 
between trades on nonannouncement days for all five utilities, except for the Otter Tail 
Corp., because market participants tend to react frequently when there is news released. 
No systematic pattern is reflected in the return statistics. I do find that returns tend to be 
more positive on nonannouncement days than on announcements days; however, returns 
reveal no significant differences between announcement days and nonannouncement days 
for utilities in the Negative Rank Group. The summary statistics for 1994 do not offer 
new insights regarding the influence of time lapse between trades and the level of returns.
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Table 4a Summary Statistics and Test for Differences in Means between AD and NAD 
for 2001
B A S a o B S Z a o O S Z a d N O B S A n t s z a o TBT a d R T N a d
Deregulated
M S  NAD B S Z n a d O S Z n a D N O B S n a d T SZ Na d t b t n a d k t n n a d
DQE 1.0292” ' 1.1132"* 1.1937'" 1.6257’" 1.2873 0.8370’" -0.4439"
PPL 1.0029 1.0990*** 1.1380'" 1.4999'" 1.1926"* 0.9712" -0.1724"*
EE 1.0351” ' 1.1209” * 1.0796"' 1.4551'" 0.9943 0.9460 -0.3395
Regulated
IDA 0.9451 1.0288 1.0564 1.4135 1.3219 0.9415 8.7000
CNL 0.8787"* 0.8257*" 1.0505*" 1.3805'" 0.8617"* 0.9394" -0.5426
OTTR 1.1071“ ’ 0.8871"* 1.3310'** 1.1599 1.0759 1.1675” 1.6612
* Significant at the 10% level o f significance 
** Significant at the 5% level of significance 
*" Significant at the 1% level o f significance
Table 4b Summary Statistics and Test for Differences in Means between AD and NAD 
for 1994
B A S a d B S Z a d O S Z a d N O B S a d T S Z a d TBT a d R T N a d
M S Na d B S Z n a d O S Z NAD N O B S Na d T S Z h a d TBTn a D B T N h a d
DQE 0.9993 0.7848” ’ 0.8960'" 1.7188'" 1.0715 0.9948 -0.5357
PPL 0.9781' 1.2871’" 1.2774'" 1.5259'" 1.3111 1.0767" 0.1100
ELPAQ 1.0765 1 1 1.2170’" 1.0171 1.3205"' -2.2685
IDA 0.9914 0.8613” 0.8952" 1.3974"’ 1.4135” 1.0598 0.2273
CNL 1.0022 1.0081 0.9509 1.1127' 1.4435" 1.0078 -0.5521
OTTR 0.9865 1 0.9945 1.2938’" 1.0452 0.8982 -0.8748
* Significant at the 10% level o f significance 
*’ Significant at the 5% level o f significance 
*** Significant at the 1% level o f significance
Two key statistical inferences may be drawn from Tables 4a and 4b. First, the 
summary statistics in Table 4a provide evidence that utilities in the Positive Rank Group 
are more responsive to news than utilities in the Negative Rank Groups, as supported by 
the BAS statistics in 2001. The BAS statistics in 1994, the year before deregulation, 
show that there is no significant difference between the volatility of the BAS on 
announcement days and the BAS on nonannouncement days, with only one exception, 
the Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. Even though the Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. 
exhibits a difference between the volatility of the BAS on announcement days and the 
BAS on nonannouncement days at 10% level of significance, it is in a wrong direction
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indicating the volatility of nonannouncement days is actually greater than the volatility of 
announcement days before regulation. This suggests that utilities are buffered by 
regulation and are therefore indifferent to exogenous impact-economic factors. Second, 
the number of transactions (NOBS) exhibits a noteworthy pattern: the number of 
transactions per minute presents strong and systematic evidence that there are more 
transactions occurring on announcements days than on nonannouncement days for all 
utilities in 2001 and 1994. The higher number of transactions across five of the six 
utilities on announcement days over nonannouncement days validates the two-step 
filtering procedure I use to separate announcement days from nonannouncement days. A 
priori, if the two-step filtering procedure is sound, then the number of transactions on 
announcement days would be greater than the number of transactions on 
nonannouncement days, since market participants are expected to react rapidly and 
frequently to the news releases. Figure 2 illustrates the number of transactions per 
minute (NOBS) and the t-value of the difference between the means of announcement 
days and the means of nonannouncement days for utilities in the Positive Rank Group 
(deregulated), and Figure 3 shows the same information for utilities in the Negative Rank 
Group (regulated).
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□  AD 
■  NAD 
□t-value
□AD 
■NAD 
□  t-value
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20  - 
10 -  
0
El Paso Electric
2001 1994
□AD
■NAD
□t-value
Utility Name Groups belonged NOBSaq
2001
NOBSnm, t-value NOBSad
1994
NOBSnao t-value
DQE, Inc. High-Rank Group 27.59 16.97 19.045*" 4.94 2.87 13.473*"
PPL Corp. High-Rank Group 74.94 49.96 21.441*" 9.88 6.47 13.981*"
El Paso Electric High-Rank Group 10.55 7.25 8.56*" 3.27 2.69 3.049*"
NOBSAD is the average number of transactions per minute for a given company across all AD days.
N06Snm> is the average number of transactions per minute for a given company across all NAD days. 
Significant at the 10% level of significance 
** Significant at the 5% level o f significance 
™ Significant at the 1% level o f significance
Figure 2: NOBS between ADs and NADs for Deregulated Utilities
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□  AD 
■  NAD 
□t-value
□AD 
■  NAD 
□t-value
DAD 
■  NAD 
□t-value
2001 1994
Utility Name Groups belonged N0BSAD NOBS**, t-value NOBSAD NOBS,*® t-value
Idacorp Power Inc Negative-Rank Group 23.92 16.92 12.974*“ 4.02 2.88 8.201*“
Cleco Corporation Negative-Rank Group 18.08 13.09 8.732*“ 1.97 1.77 1.682*
Otter Tail Corp Negative-Rank Group 5.94 5.12 1.56 1.96 1.51 3.628
NOBS* o is the average number of transactions per minute tor a given company across all AD days. 
NOBSwo is the average number of transactions per minute for a  given companpcross all NAD days.
'  Significant at the 10% level of significance 
** Significant at the 5% level of significance 
Significant at the 1 % level of significance
Figure 3: NOBS between ADs and NADs for Regulated Utilities
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Table 5a: Summary Statistics and Test for Differences in Variance between AD and 
NAD for 2001
B A S a o b s z a d O S Z a d n o b s a d T S Z a d T B T a d R T N a d
B A S Na d b s z Na d o s z NAD N O B S ffA D 7 5 2 NAD t b t n a d R T N n a d
1.9273'” 1.3466'” 1.5270"' 1.8451” ' 21.9803” ' 0.7310"' 1.3387'”
1.1283'” 2.4324'” 1.5179’” 1.2971” 1.5317'" 0.8588’" 1.1796'”
1.2808” ' 1.6065” ' 1.6038'” 2.2599” ' 0.5099'" 0.9756 2.8540"'
0.8870'” 0.0988” ' 1.2308"' 1.0604 176.5353"' 0.9026'” 0.9134'”
0.8683"' 0.7053” ' 1.2382"' 1.2906” 1.1049” ’ 0.7938’” 0.8772'”
1.2272” ' 0.7328'” 2.5984” ' 0.9851 1.2944"’ 1.0984" 0.9884
Deregulated
DQE
PPL
EE
Regulated
IDA
CNL
OTTR
’ Significant at the 10% level o f significance 
*' Significant at the 5% level o f significance 
*" Significant at the 1% level of significance
Table 5b: Summary Statistics and Test for Differences in Variance between AD and 
NAD for 1994
B A S  a d B S Z a d O S Z a d N O B S  A O T S Z a d TBTa d R T N a d
b a s NAd b s z n a d O S Z NAD N O B S Na d t s z Na d TBT n a d b t n n a d
DQE 0.6843'" 0.7288"' 0.4080” ' 1.7077” ’ 0.9239 0.9371 0.9389
PPL 0.8899" 1.6908'" 1.9818"’ 1.6290"’ 2.2940’" 1.3273’" 0.9701
ELPAQ 1.5761 N/A N/A 1.9897'" 0.8918’ 1.4878’’’ 1.7678’”
IDA 2.5046'" 0.7631” ’ 0.8437” 1.9248’’’ 5.7936’" 1.1017’ 1.9439'”
CNL 1.0003 0.8856' 1.2704” ’ 1.2201 5.1246” ’ 0.9539 0.9480
OTTR 0.8975 N/A N/A 2.0062” ’ 0.8460 0.8109' 1.1262
’ Significant at the 10% level o f significance 
"  Significant at the 5% level o f significance 
Significant at the 1% level o f significance
I also examine variances and the differences in variances between announcement 
days and nonannouncement days for 2001 and for 1994 for all seven variables, (see 
summary statistics in Tables Sa and Sb.) Similar to the finding presented in Table 4a, all 
utilities in the Positive Rank Group exhibit larger BAS variances on announcement days 
than on nonannouncement days. This is true for only one utility, Otter Tail Corp in the 
Negative Rank Group. Idacorp, Inc., and Cleco Corporation, on the other hand, exhibit 
reversed results; that is, the BAS variances on announcement days are smaller than the 
BAS variances on nonannouncement days. Bid sizes and returns show contrasting results 
between the Positive Rank Group and the Negative Rank Group. The variances of bid
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sizes are significantly larger on announcement days than on nonannouncement days for 
utilities in the Positive Rank Group, whereas this finding is reversed for utilities in the 
Negative Rank Group: variances of bid sizes are smaller on announcement days than on 
nonannouncement days. Similarly, the variances of returns are significantly larger on 
announcement days than on nonannouncement days for utilities in the Positive Rank 
Group, a trend that is also reversed for utilities in the Negative Rank Group. No 
significant contrasts are found for the offer sizes, the number of transactions, and the 
trading sizes. In the time between trades, there are smaller variances on announcement 
days than on nonannouncement days for all utilities except for Otter Tail Corp. This is 
consistent with the findings of the differences between the mean values on announcement 
days and the mean values on nonannouncement days, and supports the premise that 
market participants tend to react frequently to news releases, (see Table 5b for summary 
statistics of variances for all seven variables.) Statistics show that there are no obvious 
findings except that, on the average, the differences in variance between announcement 
days and nonannouncement days are less significant in 1994 (before deregulation) than 
are those in 2001 (after deregulation).
4.2: Results of BFL F Tests
The results of BFL F test (reported in Table 6) for the year 2001 indicate a strong 
contrast in response to news between utilities in the Positive Rank Group and utilities in 
the Negative Rank Group. The ratios of the standard deviation for the announcement 
days to the standard deviation for the nonannouncement days (ST D ad/ST D nad) are all 
greater than one for utilities in the Positive Rank Group. This indicates that the return
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variances on announcement days are consistently greater than the return variances on 
nonannouncement days for deregulated utilities. Conversely, STD ad/STD nad are 
consistently smaller than 1, indicating that the return variances on announcement days are 
smaller than the return variances on nonannouncement days for regulated utilities. For 
instance, the ratio for DQE, Inc., (a deregulated utility) is 1.16, whereas the ratio for 
Idacorp. Inc., (a regulated utility) is 0.96. This provides strong evidence to support my 
argument that utilities that are highly deregulated are no longer buffered by regulation 
and thus respond to news releases more strongly. Comparing the p-values from the 
Positive Rank Group to those from the Negative Rank Group, I find that all variances on 
announcement days are significantly larger than variances on nonannouncement days. 
For instance, the F-value for DQE, Inc., is 11.1522, and its p-value 0.0008, significant at 
1% level of significance. Conversely, the F-value for Idacorp, Inc., is 16.0282 and its p- 
value 0.0001, but its variance values indicate that the variance on nonannouncement days 
is significantly larger than the variance on announcement days. For Otter Tail Corp, 
there is no significant difference between the variance of announcement days and the 
variance of nonannouncement days since p-value is 0.5711.
Examining the BFL F test for utilities in 1994, the year before deregulation, 
(Table 7), I find that there are no differences in return variance between announcement 
days and nonannouncement days for four of the six utilities. For two of the three utilities 
that belong to the Positive Rank Group, I find the ratios to be less than 1 and their p- 
values are insignificant in 1994, but I find these same two utilities have ratios greater than 
1 with a significance level at about 1% level in 2001. This too supports the premise of 
increased responses to news releases when utilities move from a regulated environment to
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a deregulated environment. On the other hand, Table 7 shows that all three utilities 
belonging to the Negative Rank Group are regressed in response to news releases. For 
instance, the STD Ad/ST D nad ratio for Idacorp Power, Inc., is greater than 1 and 
significant at 10% level of significance in 1994, whereas the S T D ad/ST D nad ratio 
changes to less than 1 with a 1% level of significance. Similarly, Cleco Corporation 
(named Central Louisiana Electric Co., Inc., in 1994) shows a ratio of 0.97 and 
insignificant in 1994, whereas its ratio is 0.94 with a significance level at 1% in 2001. 
Furthermore, Otter Tail Corp (named Otter Tail Power Corp. in 1994) shows a ratio of
1.06 and insignificant in 1994, whereas its ratio changes to 0.99 and insignificant in 2001. 
This shows the responses to news are regressed for all three utilities belonging to the 
Negative Rank Group. Taken together, Table 6 and Table 7 suggest that the process of 
deregulation has increased the responses to news releases. These findings appear to be 
robust, even considering size and capital structure differences. For instance, the PPL 
Corporation has the largest assets and debt-to-equity ratio in 2001 but an F-value less 
than DQE, Inc’s. Even in 1994, the PPL Corporation (named Pennsylvania Power & 
Light Co. in 1994) still has the largest assets and larger debt-to-equity ratio than, for 
instance, Idacorp Power, Inc., but the PPL Corporation does not respond to news more 
than Idacorp Power, Inc. For example, in 1994, PPL Corporation has the S T D ad/ST D nad 
ratio of 0.98, F-value of 0.5438, and p-value of 0.4609, but Idacorp Power, Inc., has a 
ratio of 1.39, an F-value o f2.7956, and a p-value o f0.0946.
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Table 6: BFL F Tests for Differences in Return Variance between AD and NAD for 2001
N ad N nad
S T D a d
s t d n a d
F -  value p -  value
Deregulated
DQE, Inc. 10696 6575 1.16 11.1522 0.0008
PPL Corporation 29267 19511 1.09 6.6238 0.0101
El Paso Electric 4088 2801 1.69 3.1454 0.0762
Regulated
Idacorp,Inc. 9318 6590 0.96 16.0282 0.0001
Cleco Corporation 7033 5093 0.94 11.0759 0.0009
Otter Tail Corp 2131 1705 0.99 0.3210 0.5711
Table 7: BFL F Tests for Differences in Return Variance between AD and NAD for 1994
Nad Nnad
std4D
stdNad F -  value p -  value
DQE, Inc. 1883 1011 0.97 0.0508 0.8216
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. 3814 2482 0.98 0.5438 0.4609
El Paso Electric 1117 866 1.33 18.1529 <0.0001
Idacorp Power Inc. 1489 944 1.39 2.7956 0.0946
Central Louisiana Electric Co. Inc. 526 322 0.97 0.1986 0.6560
Otter Tail Power Corp. 433 245 1.06 0.0942 0.7589
The BFL F-statistic is: F™i =
J
J  ”/ ___
YL{D’J-dj)2{J-])
; = i i= i
where F„i follows an F distribution with J - l  and degrees o f freedom.
Dv = is the absolute deviation from its group mean and rsj  is the return at second s  from group j .  M j  is the sample median
return computed over the n, returns in j  group.
■ * - i & )1=1 V 7
is the mean absolute deviation from the median for group j.
7=1 1=1 V
is the grand mean absolute deviation where ° s j  is summed over all n j  seconds of j  groups and N  is the total
number o f absolute deviations from its group mean o f j  groups. J i s l  for AD group and 2 for NAD group. Reject H0 if F„i > F(l-a; 
J - l, N-J)
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4.3: Results of Regression Tests 
Using the NAD file as a control to filter out random effects, I find that the results 
of the BFL F test provide evidence that the process of deregulation has increased the 
responses to news releases. In order to build robustness into my findings, I perform 
regression tests on return volatility. It is not surprising that the results of regression tests 
show that utilities in the Positive Rank Group exhibit more pronounced responses to 
news releases than the utilities in the Negative Rank Group.
Table 8 shows the results of regression tests for 2001 using Maximum Likelihood 
method with 3 lags to correct autocorrelation problems.35 All utilities in the Positive 
Rank Group show pronounced responses to macroeconomic news releases at a 1% level 
of significance. Idacorp, Inc., and Cleco Corporation in the Negative Rank Group show 
mild responses to macroeconomic news at a 10% level of significance, whereas Otter Tail 
Corp shows no responses to macroeconomic news. The positive sign of coefficients for 
macroeconomic news indicates that macroeconomic news increases return volatility.
Other variables used in the regression tests also exhibit some significant 
information. In general, the deregulated utilities respond more often to the standardized 
volume measure than the regulated utilities do. And time between trades is significant at 
a 1% level of significance across all utilities. The buy-sell indicator is negative and 
significant for five of six utilities. This negative coefficient of the buy-sell indicator 
denotes a bid/ask bounce. For instance, if the previous trades were buyer-initiated 
trades, then it is expected that the subsequent trades will be seller-initiated trades, a
13 Heteroscedasticity usually does not occur in time-series data. For precautionary reasons, I use the
procedures described in Chapter 3 to detect and correct autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity for utilities
in 2001. Results of significances of independent variables are not much different from results reported in
Table 8 and Table 9.
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transaction shift that will cause price bounces from ask to bid, hence a price change that 
becomes negative. Conversely, if  the previous trades were seller-initiated trades, then it 
is expected that the next trades will be buyer-initiated trades, a transaction which will 
cause price bounces from bid to ask, hence a price change that becomes positive.
The interaction of bid-ask spread and return volatility from a previous transaction 
(lag (BASs-i*0s)) is significant for all utilities, indicating that market participants take 
into account the bid-ask spread as well as the risks. The interaction of bid-ask spread, 
return volatility, and the sign of return from a previous transaction (lag (BASs.i*os*Is‘)) is 
positive and significant for only three utilities; therefore, it is not clear whether the 
negative returns have a larger impact on the return volatility.
In order to check overall improvement in news responses from 1994 to 2001 in 
BFL F tests, I conduct regression tests for 1994. The results (Table 9) show a strong 
contrast to the results in the 2001 sample. I do not find significant increases in responses 
to macroeconomic news from any of the six utilities in 1994, and, overall, I find less 
response to other variables as well. This suggests that there is an overall improvement 
from 1994 to 2001 in terms of responses to exogenous variables. In addition, the 
responses to macroeconomic news are stronger for utilities serving in highly deregulated 
states. This provides empirical evidence that utilities respond more vigorously to market 
forces in a deregulated environment.
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Table 8: Regression Tests for Deregulated Utilities and Regulated Utilities in 2001
Constant
D macro 
Didio
BSI
VOLjdj
Lag(BAS„,*os) 
Lag(BASn*o,*I) 
TBT 
Total R2
Deregulated Utilities 
DQE
0.000557***
0.000154***
0.000980**’
-0.000087*’*
0.00000096992**
-0.004844***
0.002203
0.00000065061***
0.0511
PPL
0.000181*”
0.0000549***
-0.000129
-0.000029*’*
0.0000170***
-0.0147***
0.0107***
0.0000012904*
0.0602
* Significant at the 10% level of significance 
** Significant at the 5% level o f significance 
*** Significant at the 1% level of significance
EE
0.000994***
0.000436*’*
- 0.000210
-0.000146***
0.0000203***
-0.000799**
0 .0102**’
0.00000026194*
0.2362
Regulated Utilities 
IDA
0.000403***
0.0000417*
0.000673**
-0.000057***
0.00000030199
0.009165***
-0.002272
0.00000052657***
0.0608
CNL
0.000575***
0.0000798*
-0.000064
-0.000071***
0.0000480***
0.002228*
0.002956
0.00000065487***
0.1
OTTR
0.002504***
0.000294
0.000457
-0.000045
0.0000631
0.006082***
0.003229***
0.0000016596*
0.1185
Table 9: Regression Tests for Regulated Utilities in 1994
DQE PPL ELPAQ IDA CNL OTTR
Constant 0.001394*** 0.002050*** 0.009514*** 0.001003*** 0.002345*** 0.006601
Dmacro 0.000133 -0.000063 0.003167 -0.000082 -0.000019 0.001481
Didio -0.000847 -0.000362 -0.000764 -0.000684^ -0.000453 N/A
BSI 0.0000421 -0.000117*** 0.002684*** -0.000188*** 0.000401*** 0.000242
VOL*jj 0.0000211** 0.0000139*** -0.000473 0.0000590 0.0000140 -0.000639**
Ug(BASf.,*o,) 0.005535* 0.000458 0.006484*** 0.0220 0.006075 0.007343**
Lag(BAS1.1*a,*I) 0.003345 0.002514 -0.002750***
##*
0.0759 0.0105** 0.001173
TBT 0.00000029411*** 0.000000023047 0.000002193 0.00000025338*** 0.00000013702** 0.00000023972
Total R2 0.0364 0.0410 0.1238 0.2362 0.0602 0.0659
* Significant at the 10% level of significance 
** Significant at the 5% level of significance 
*** Significant at the 1% level of significance
CHAPTERS
CONCLUSION
The deregulation o f the electric utility is designed to reduce government 
intervention, to let the interaction of supply and demand determine wholesale power 
price, and to encourage competition in retail markets so that customers may choose their 
power suppliers, based on options of low rates or high-quality services. With this in 
mind, I examine one particular purpose of deregulation in the electric utility industry- 
making utility operations more responsive to market force. My premise is that utilities 
that provide electricity to highly deregulated states will be more responsive to market 
forces than those providing electricity to regulated states. To investigate this issue, I use 
the following sampling procedures: First, to identify two categories of utilities, I identify 
states that are moving toward to customer-choice model and states that specifically reject 
the customer-choice method of deregulation. The Retail Energy Deregulation (RED) 
Index, 2nd edition, July 2001, from the Center for the Advancement of Energy Markets 
provides a sound basis to categorize these states, using 22 attributes. Second, I sample 
two extreme groups from their ranking distribution: the Positive Rank Group states and 
the Negative Rank Group states. Third, for each category, I find three utilities serving 
predominantly highly deregulated states and three utilities serving regulated states.
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To measure the success of the deregulation process of each state, I examine 
utilities’ responses to market forces, comparing utilities providing electricity to highly 
deregulated states with those providing electricity to regulated states in 2001. In order to 
develop a more accurate and robust base of reference, I also examine the responses of the 
specified utilities to market forces for the year 1994 (the year preceding deregulation). 
Next, I identify twenty-two of the most important microeconomic news releases by 
governmental and private agencies as a proxy of market forces for 2001 and 1994. To 
measure the instantaneous responses of stock prices to these news releases, I then secure 
intraday trade and quote data from the New York Stock Exchange Trade and Quote 
database for the sample period of April to June of 2001 and April to June of 1994. I use a 
two-step filtering procedure to separate trade and quote data into two files: the 
announcement days file (AD file) and the nonannouncement days file (NAD file). The 
AD file for each utility contains the following data: the bid-ask spread (BAS), the bid size 
(BSZ), the offer size (OSZ), the trade size (TSZ), the number of transactions traded at 
minute m (NOBSm), and the time lapse between trades in seconds (TBT) on days that 
have at least one news release (macroeconomic news and/or idiosyncratic news), whereas 
the NAD file for each utility contains the same set of data but on days that have no news 
releases. The NAD file is used as a control to filter random effects.
After the trade and quote data are separated into Announcement Days file and 
Nonannouncement Days file, I conduct a t-test and identify two key statistical inferences 
from the summary statistics. First, the summary statistics of the BAS provide evidence 
that utilities in the Positive Rank Group are more responsive to news releases than 
utilities in the Negative Rank Groups for the year 2001. The BAS statistics in 1994, the
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year before deregulation, show that there is no significant difference between the 
volatility of the BAS on announcement days and the BAS on nonannouncement days, 
with only one exception, the Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. This suggests that utilities 
are buffered by regulation and are therefore indifferent to exogenous impact- 
macroeconomic factors. Second, the number of transactions (NOBS) exhibits a 
significant pattern: the number of transactions per minute presents strong and systematic 
evidence that more transactions occur on announcements days than on nonannouncement 
days for all utilities in both 2001 and 1994.
Ross (1989) maintains that the arrival of information has a direct impact on the 
volatility of stock prices in an arbitrage-free environment. For my study, I investigate the 
stock return responses to release news, using the Brown-Forsythe-Modified Levene 
(BFL) test to examine the volatility differences between days with released news and 
days without released news. The results of BFL F test (reported in Table 6) for the year 
2001 indicate a strong contrast in response to news between utilities in the Positive Rank 
Group and utilities in the Negative Rank Group. The ratios of the standard deviation for 
the announcement days to the standard deviation for the nonannouncement days 
(ST D ad/ST D nad) are all greater than 1 for utilities in the Positive Rank Group. This 
indicates that the return variances on announcement days are consistently greater than the 
return variances on nonannouncement days for deregulated utilities. Conversely, the 
ratios of ST D ad/ST D nad are consistently smaller than 1, indicating that the return 
variances on announcement days are smaller than the return variances on 
nonannouncement days for regulated utilities. This provides strong evidence to support 
my argument that utilities that are highly deregulated are no longer buffered by regulation
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and thus respond more strongly to news releases. Examining the BFL F test for utilities 
in 1994, the year before deregulation, (Table 7), I find no differences in return variance 
between announcement days and nonannouncement days for four of the six utilities. For 
two of the three utilities that belong to the Positive Rank Group, I find the ratios to be 
less than 1 and their p-values insignificant in 1994, but I find that these same two utilities 
have ratios greater than 1 with a significance level at about 1% level in 2001. These 
findings also support the premise of increased responses to news releases when utilities 
move from a regulated environment to a deregulated environment. My findings appear to 
be robust, even considering size and capital structure differences. For example, the PPL 
Corporation has the largest assets and debt-to-equity ratio in 2001, but an F-value less 
than DQE, Inc’s. Even in 1994, the PPL Corporation (named Pennsylvania Power & 
Light Co. in 1994) still shows larger assets and larger debt-to-equity ratio than, for 
instance, Idacorp Power, Inc., but the PPL Corporation does not respond to news more 
strongly than Idacorp Power, Inc.
My last test, a regression test, examines the effects of macroeconomic news; 
idiosyncratic news; standardized volumes; a buy-sell indicator; the interaction between 
bid-ask spread and return volatility from a previous transaction (lag (BASs-i*os)); the 
interaction between bid-ask spread, return volatility, and the sign of return from a 
previous transaction (lag (BASs.i*cs*Is')); and time lapse between trade on return 
volatility. The results o f the regression test support the findings from BFL tests that all 
utilities in the Positive Rank Group show pronounced responses to macroeconomic news 
releases at a 1% level of significance, whereas fewer responses are shown in the Negative 
Rank Group for the year 2001. Furthermore, the regression tests of 1994 give evidence
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even more striking—findings show that none of the utilities respond to macroeconomic 
news releases. Given the strong and significant responses from the utilities in the High 
Rank Group and fewer responses from the utilities in the Negative Rank Group for the 
year 2001, the findings for the year 1994 reconfirm my conjecture that deregulation in the 
electric utility industry does, in fact, make utility operations more responsive to market 
forces and that deregulation is indeed effective for states that implement a customer- 
choice model. Both BFL F tests and regression tests provide substantial empirical 
evidence that utilities respond more vigorously to market forces in a deregulated 
environment and that deregulation is indeed effective in states that implement a 
customer-choice model.
The contributions of this study to the power industry may be identified as follows: 
(1) the success of deregulation depends largely on each state’s restructuring plan; 
therefore, this study provides state and federal legislatures with empirical evidence of the 
effectiveness of deregulation; (2) the findings of this study will influence the way state 
and federal legislatures enact utility laws; (3) this study provides empirical evidence of 
successful deregulation models; therefore, a further study of the restructuring policies of 
successful deregulation models could be done to improve the competition of the electric 
utility industry in all states; (4) this study provides methods that may be applied to other 
deregulated industries.
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RED INDEX SCORES AND ATTRIBUTE LISTING
Exhibit 3-1: RED Index Scores in July 200136
Sea. No. States Rank Score
1 Pennsylvania 1 66
2 Texas 2 65
3 New York 3 64
4 Maine 4 62
5 DC 5 56
6 Maryland 5 56
7 New Jersey 7 47
8 Arizona 7 47
9 Virginia 9 45
10 Illinois 9 45
11 Montana 11 44
12 Connecticut 12 43
13 Michigan 13 42
14 Massachusetts 14 41
15 Ohio 15 39
16 Rhode Island 16 36
17 California 17 34
18 Delaware 18 31
19 New Hampshire 19 27
20 Oregon 20 24
21 West Virginia 21 17
22 Arkansas 21 17
23 Nevada 23 12
24 New Mexico 24 9
“ Source is from Retail Energy Deregulation (RED) Index, 2nd edition, July 2001, pp. 136-138, Center for 
the Advancement of Energy Markets. A score of 0 indicates that a state is still implementing the 
traditional monopolistic model; a score of 100 indicates that a state is completely and effectively 
implementing the customer choice model, whereas a negative score indicates that a state explicitly rejects 
the policies of restructuring in the retail energy market.
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Sea. No. States Rank Score
25 Vermont 25 6
26 Kentucky 26 3
27 Washington 27 2
28 Alaska 28 0
29 Florida 28 0
30 Georgia 28 0
31 Hawaii 28 0
32 Indiana 28 0
33 Iowa 28 0
34 Kansas 28 0
35 Missouri 28 0
36 North Carolina 28 0
37 North Dakota 28 0
38 Oklahoma 28 0
39 South Carolina 28 0
40 South Dakota 28 0
41 Tennessee 28 0
42 Utah 28 0
43 Wisconsin 28 0
44 Wyoming 28 0
45 Nebraska 51 -8
46 Colorado 51 -8
47 Idaho 51 -8
48 Alabama 51 -8
49 Louisiana 51 -8
50 Minnesota 51 -8
51 Mississippi 51 -8
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Exhibit 3-2: Attribute Listing37
A. Competitive Framework Cluster
1. Does a detailed plan exist?
2. What percentage of customers are eligible?
3. What percentage of customers have switched?
4. What safeguards prevent utility/affiliate favoritism?
5. How standardized are business practices?
6. Is billing a competitive service?
7. Is metering a competitive service?
B. Generation Cluster
8. What is the market structure for generation?
9. How controlled is the wholesale market?
10. Do stranded costs meet a market test?
11. Are stranded cost charges fixed?
C. Consumer Cluster
12. Are suppliers granted effective access to customer information?
13. Is a comprehensive consumer education program required?
14. How are default customers handled?
D. Distribution Cluster
15. Do default prices allow effective competition from suppliers?
16. Are default rates properly set?
17. Is performance-based pricing used for network facilities?
18. Are efficient pricing principles used for network pricing?
19. Do policies impede small-scale generation?
E. Commission Cluster
20. Are gas and electric policies integrated?
21. Has the commission reengineered its processes for new regime?
22. Is commission budget commensurate with new responsibilities?
37 Source is from Retail Energy Deregulation (RED) Index, 2nd edition, July 2001, pp. 5-6,41-71, Center 
for the Advancement of Energy Markets.
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